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When Should Employers Be Liable for 
Factoring Biased Customer Feedback into 
Employment Decisions? 
Dallan F. Flake† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Following a checkup at the local medical clinic, Mark stops 
by the reception desk to fill out an anonymous survey about his 
visit in exchange for ten dollars off his bill. Mark skims the ques-
tionnaire, rates his doctor, Melanie Flowers, mostly threes (out 
of five), and is on his way. When the clinic is forced to lay off one 
of its doctors two months later, it decides to terminate Dr. Flow-
ers because she has the lowest patient-satisfaction scores. Dr. 
Flowers subsequently files a sex discrimination lawsuit against 
the clinic based on her suspicion Mark and other patients rated 
her lower because she is a woman. If Dr. Flowers is right, should 
the clinic be liable? 
The answer to this question is more complicated than it 
might seem. If the feedback for Dr. Flowers was explicitly sexist, 
and the medical clinic knew it—suppose Mark had written 
“Women belong in the home, not the doctor’s office!” across the 
bottom of his survey—it seems reasonable to hold the clinic lia-
ble, because it knew the feedback was sexist and still factored it 
into the termination decision. But what if neither Mark nor any 
other patient had written anything sexist on the survey, yet 
nonetheless rated Dr. Flowers lower because they viewed female 
doctors as less competent than male doctors? Would it still make 
sense to hold the clinic liable if it had no reason to suspect Dr. 
Flowers’s ratings, which were just slightly lower than the other 
doctors’ ratings, were tainted by bias? Taking it a step further, 
what if Mark and the other respondents genuinely thought they 
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were being objective in their ratings, but their unconscious bi-
ases nonetheless skewed their perceptions of Dr. Flowers, caus-
ing them to give her lower ratings? Could the clinic be liable for 
using customer feedback that nobody—including the raters 
themselves—suspected was sexist? 
This hypothetical raises important and novel questions that 
current employment discrimination laws seem ill equipped to 
answer. Indeed, it is not merely coincidental that by the end of 
2017 there still were no published court opinions directly ad-
dressing whether, or to what extent, employers should be liable 
for using discriminatory customer feedback to make employment 
decisions (what I refer to as “customer feedback discrimination”). 
The most instructive guidance in this regard derives from cus-
tomer preference cases, in which courts routinely hold that em-
ployers cannot discriminate against employees based on custom-
ers’ discriminatory preferences.1 But those cases universally 
involve customer preferences that are blatantly discriminatory; 
so while they are useful in thinking about how courts would an-
alyze the first scenario (where Mark left an explicitly sexist com-
ment at the bottom of his survey), they are not particularly help-
ful in the latter two situations, where the bias is not obvious to 
the employer either because the respondents disguise their bi-
ases as objective ratings or because the respondents are unaware 
their implicit biases tainted their ratings. 
While courts and scholars alike have heavily scrutinized em-
ployers’ reliance on biased employee evaluations from supervi-
sors in making employment decisions,2 employers’ use of biased 
 
 1. See, e.g., Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908, 913 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (“It is now widely accepted that a company’s desire to cater to the 
perceived . . . preferences of its customers is not a defense under Title VII for 
treating employees differently . . . .”); Pleener v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 
311 F. App’x 479, 482 (2d Cir. 2009) (“We agree that federal law does not permit 
an employer to discriminate based on race to accommodate the actual or per-
ceived invidious biases of its clientele.”); Lam v. Univ. of Haw., 40 F.3d 1551, 
1560 n.13 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The existence of . . . third party preferences for dis-
crimination does not, of course, justify discriminatory hiring practices.”); Diaz 
v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971) (“[I]t would be 
totally anomalous if we were to allow the preferences and prejudices of the cus-
tomers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid.”); Williams v. 
G4S Secure Sols. (USA), Inc., No. ELH-10-3476, 2012 WL 1698282, at *22 (D. 
Md. May 11, 2012) (“Courts have repeatedly held employers responsible for dis-
crimination against their employees, even when the employer itself claimed to 
be free of bias.”). 
 2. See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) 
(alleging sexist performance evaluations the plaintiff received earlier in her ten-
ure with the employer had resulted in lower pay than her male colleagues 
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customer feedback to make employment decisions has gone 
largely unchecked. Only recently have commentators raised con-
cerns that this practice could open the door to discrimination 
claims. Noah Zatz contends that employers should not be able to 
“launder” out discriminatory intent from an employment deci-
sion merely because such intent is folded into a customer’s feed-
back.3 More recently, Lu-in Wang has argued that the law 
should not allow discrimination in employment to masquerade 
as customer service and should “hold employers accountable for 
the ways in which they facilitate, and benefit from, customers’ 
discrimination against service workers.”4 Zatz proposes, and 
Wang endorses,5 an accommodation-based model of liability, 
whereby an employer could be held liable for basing an employ-
ment decision on discriminatory customer feedback if: “(1) The 
employee suffered employment-related harm . . . [;] (2) [t]he em-
ployee suffered that harm because of her membership in a pro-
tected class . . . [;] and (3) [t]here is a basis for holding the em-
ployer responsible.”6 Although this theory sheds new and 
important light on how existing frameworks can be refashioned 
to address customer feedback discrimination, it appears the 
model would only reach cases involving explicitly discriminatory 
customer feedback.7 Thus we are still left to wonder how the law 
should respond when employers base employment decisions on 
customer feedback in which the taint of bias is less obvious. 
 
through the end of her career); McGowan v. Bd. of Trs. of Metro. State Univ., 
645 F. App’x 667, 670 (10th Cir. 2016) (alleging race discrimination and retali-
ation based on poor performance reviews); Kayky v. Boeing Co., No. C15-
0488RSL, 2016 WL 6525808, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2016) (alleging negative 
performance evaluations were pretext for national origin discrimination); R. 
Lawrence Ashe, Jr. & Ginger S. McRae, Performance Evaluations Go to Court 
in the 1980’s [sic], 36 MERCER L. REV. 887, 892–97 (1985) (discussing how sub-
jective performance evaluation systems are susceptible to legal challenges); 
Audrey J. Lee, Note, Unconscious Bias Theory in Employment Discrimination 
Litigation, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 481 (2005) (arguing that implicit bias 
affects performance evaluations). 
 3. Noah D. Zatz, Managing the Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommo-
dation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1357, 1416–17 (2009). 
 4. Lu-in Wang, When the Customer Is King: Employment Discrimination 
as Customer Service, 23 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 249, 250 (2016). 
 5. See id. at 286–91. 
 6. Zatz, supra note 3, at 1413. 
 7. See id. at 1416–22 (identifying examples where the accommodation-
based model limits liability to cases involving explicitly discriminatory cus-
tomer feedback). 
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I argue in this Article that the dearth of attention given to 
customer feedback discrimination from courts and scholars alike 
is not because the problem is nonexistent or inconsequential. To 
the contrary, a growing chorus of researchers has found that 
both explicit and implicit bias often taint customer feedback,8 
and firms regularly rely on such feedback to make employment 
decisions.9 The problem lies in the fact that customer feedback 
discrimination does not fit neatly under either the disparate 
treatment or the disparate impact model of discrimination—the 
only two judicially endorsed pathways to proving discrimination 
under antidiscrimination statutes—making it virtually impossi-
ble for a victim of such discrimination to prevail in court. Draw-
ing upon my previous work on employer liability for nonem-
ployee discrimination more generally,10 I contend that courts can 
and should remedy this injustice by assessing employer liability 
for customer feedback discrimination under a negligence stand-
ard. In essence, a court (or jury) need only ask two questions to 
determine liability in such cases: (1) did the employer know, or 
should it reasonably have known, that the customer feedback 
was biased; if so, (2) did the employer act reasonably in response 
by taking appropriate preventive or corrective measures? A neg-
ligence standard undoubtedly would make it easier for customer 
feedback discrimination plaintiffs to prevail. Yet the standard 
would not be so stringent that an employer would be strictly lia-
ble whenever biased feedback taints an employment decision. In-
deed, a negligence standard is advantageous because it would 
encourage employers to take reasonable measures to prevent 
such discrimination without substantially impairing their busi-
ness operations. This standard is also advantageous insofar as it 
can be applied with relative ease in both the easy cases, where 
bias is clear and explicit, and the harder cases, where bias is 
more difficult to detect. Returning to the introductory hypothet-
ical, the medical clinic’s liability under a negligence standard 
would depend on both its knowledge of and response to the bi-
ased feedback. 
Now is an especially critical time to consider the parameters 
of employer liability for customer feedback discrimination. This 
is not a problem likely to go away anytime soon; in fact, there 
are strong indicators it may become even worse. As I explain in 
 
 8. See infra Part II.B. 
 9. See infra Part I. 
 10. See generally Dallan F. Flake, Employer Liability for Non-Employee 
Discrimination, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1169 (2017). 
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Part I, we live in a customer-service-obsessed society in which 
consumers are constantly bombarded with requests for feedback. 
Employers use this feedback to make an array of employment 
decisions and this seems unlikely to change anytime soon, with 
technological advances making customer feedback even easier 
and less expensive to obtain 
Given the ubiquity of customer feedback and the high value 
employers place on it, one might logically assume the feedback 
is highly reliable in its depiction of consumers’ attitudes toward 
goods and services. In Part II, I analyze several key studies that 
not only cast serious doubt on this assumption, but also show 
that customer feedback is often tainted by explicit and, perhaps 
more commonly, implicit biases that adversely impact how con-
sumers rate service exchanges. 
In Part III, I address how customer feedback discrimination 
claims fit into the extant legal frameworks. I argue that neither 
the disparate treatment nor the disparate impact analytical 
framework is fully equipped to handle customer feedback dis-
crimination claims and, in fact, have made such claims virtually 
unwinnable. 
In light of these deficiencies, I propose in Part IV that em-
ployers be held to a negligence standard in customer feedback 
discrimination cases. I explain how applying a negligence stand-
ard is consistent with how courts analyze certain other types of 
employment discrimination claims. I argue that a reasonable 
knowledge standard would provide a viable path to recovery for 
victims of customer feedback discrimination because they would 
only have to prove the employer should have known the feedback 
was biased and failed to reasonably respond. I likewise contend 
that a negligence standard would strike an appropriate balance 
between incentivizing firms to make reasonable efforts to pre-
vent and correct customer feedback biases without detrimentally 
impacting their business operations. 
I.  CUSTOMER FEEDBACK IN THE MODERN ECONOMY   
It would be difficult to overstate the importance of customer 
satisfaction in the modern economy. Today’s customer-centric 
business environment is a result of several factors, including the 
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rise of the service economy,11 increased competition among busi-
nesses,12 the global quality revolution,13 and the ease with which 
firms can now gather customer metrics.14 Catchphrases such as 
“the customer is always right,” “customer satisfaction is our 
highest priority,” and “the customer is king” are common in the 
business world,15 as firms strive to differentiate their goods and 
services from those of their competitors. President Clinton fa-
mously acknowledged the importance of customer service in 
1993 when he introduced the National Partnership for Reinvent-
ing Government—an initiative that sought to reform the way the 
federal government worked, in part by reimagining ordinary cit-
izens as customers and by requiring agencies to set and meet 
specific customer-service standards.16 The importance of keep-
ing customers satisfied is further illustrated by a recent survey 
of over five hundred U.S. business executives, ninety-four per-
cent of whom agreed that listening to customer feedback is in-
creasingly critical to their organization’s bottom line, and ninety 
 
 11. See ANDERS GUSTAFSSON & MICHAEL D. JOHNSON, COMPETING IN A 
SERVICE ECONOMY: HOW TO CREATE A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THROUGH 
SERVICE DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION xiv (2003) (describing how customers 
in the service economy are “an essential source of information, innovation, and 
creativity”). 
 12. See Michael J. Mazzeo, Competition and Service Quality in the U.S. Air-
line Industry, 22 REV. INDUS. ORG. 275 (2003) (explaining that when customers 
are presented with more choices, firms have an incentive to improve customer 
satisfaction by offering higher-quality goods, better service, and lower prices to 
maintain their market share). 
 13. See DEREK R. ALLEN, CUSTOMER SATISFACTION RESEARCH MANAGE-
MENT 1 (2004) (“Customer satisfaction has its roots in the global quality revolu-
tion.”). 
 14. See Jenny van Doorn et al., Customer Engagement Behavior: Theoreti-
cal Foundations and Research Directions, 13 J. SERV. RES. 253, 253–54 (2010) 
(describing the rise of customer-based metrics as a means for measuring perfor-
mance). 
 15. See, e.g., BRAD STONE, THE EVERYTHING STORE: JEFF BEZOS AND THE 
AGE OF AMAZON 111 (2013) (describing Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos as obsessed 
about delivering a “flawless” customer experience); Customer Is King, AL-
LEYNE’S GENTLEMEN’S GROOMING CTR., http://alleynesgrooming.com/customer 
-is-king (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) (“Visit us at Alleyne’s, where we believe our 
Customer is King and we aim to serve every man like one.”); EDDIE SMIT’S 
AUTO. SOLS., http://www.autorepairwhitehousetn.com (last visited Apr. 22, 
2018) (“Your Satisfaction is Our Highest Priority!”); Contact Us, MOELLER MFG. 
& SUPPLY, INC., http://www.moellermfg.com/contact (last visited Apr. 22, 2018) 
(“Your satisfaction is our top priority and we’ll endeavor to maintain our status 
of 100% customer satisfaction.”). 
 16. See John Kamensky, A Brief History, NAT’L P’SHIP FOR REINVENTING 
GOV’T (Jan. 1999), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/whoweare/history2.html. 
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percent of whom reported that having customer feedback on em-
ployees helps identify “rising stars.”17 
Given the almost fanatical value placed on customer satis-
faction, it is hardly surprising that firms go to remarkable 
lengths to solicit customers’ opinions on everything from employ-
ees to ambiance. Although soliciting customer feedback is hardly 
a new phenomenon,18 the methodological and technological ad-
vances in how firms gather feedback are extraordinary. For most 
of the twentieth century, customer feedback tended to be meas-
ured informally, such as by front line staff asking people if they 
were happy or annual paper surveys of customers.19 However, 
by the 1980s, businesses began moving away from their almost 
singular focus on making the best product and became increas-
ingly concerned with boosting customer satisfaction.20 Firms em-
ployed a variety of mechanisms to collect customer feedback, in-
cluding paper surveys, comments cards, focus groups, mystery 
shoppers, polling, in-person interviews, usability testing, sug-
gestion boxes, and some inbound and outbound phone calls.21 In 
the early 1990s, Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing be-
came widespread, as did comparatively short-lived experiments 
with faxed and disk-by-mail surveys.22 
The advent of the Internet has significantly expanded feed-
back possibilities. Mobile device ratings, in-app ratings, web-
based pop-up surveys, email and text surveys, live chats over the 
internet, dedicated feedback space on websites, community 
groups and discussion boards, review sites, and social media 
sites like Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Twitter,23 allow 
firms to reach more customers more quickly and inexpensively 
 
 17. See Listening to Customer and Employee Outcomes Key to Business Per-
formance, HUNDREDX, INC. (Sept. 14, 2016), https://hundredxinc.com/news/87. 
 18. See A Brief History of Survey Research, PRAIRIE RESEARCH ASSOCS., 
http://www.pra.ca/resources/pages/files/technotes/history_e.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2018) (tracing the history of surveys from the Roman Empire, the Mid-
dle Ages, and early nineteenth century Great Britain). 
 19. See Ray Poynter, The Rise of Customer Satisfaction Research, VISION 
CRITICAL (Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.visioncritical.com/rise-customer 
-satisfaction-research. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See DEREK R. ALLEN, CUSTOMER SATISFACTION RESEARCH MANAGE-
MENT 1–14 (2004). 
 22. See Poynter, supra note 19. 
 23. See Ginny Marvin, Twitter Launches New Customer Service Feedback 
and Engagement Tools for Businesses, MARKETING LAND (Feb. 18, 2016), http:// 
www.marketingland.com/164993-164993 (discussing Twitter ’s recent rollout of 
two new tools for companies to provide support and get feedback from custom-
ers). 
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than ever before.24 Indeed, it is now common for firms to receive 
customer feedback without even soliciting it, as Yelp, Amazon, 
Google, and other web-based services create independent spaces 
for customers to share their judgments on a host of different 
goods and services. In turn, companies such as the Audience25 
and Sprout Social26 offer products that allow businesses to mon-
itor, measure, and even respond to customer-initiated feedback. 
The explosion in feedback mechanisms means customers are 
bombarded with feedback requests seemingly at every turn. Sur-
veyMonkey, one of the largest online survey developers and dis-
tributors, reports that it alone receives three million survey re-
sponses per day.27 In the course of writing this Article, I received 
customer satisfaction questionnaires in the mail from my real-
tor, health insurance company, and mechanic. During telephone 
calls to my bank and credit-card company, I was invited to stay 
on the line to rate my experience with the customer service rep-
resentatives. Several apps on my phone requested I rate them. 
A postal worker showed me on my receipt where I could go online 
to give feedback about my experience at the Post Office. After a 
recent trip, I received follow-up emails from an airline, hotel, and 
car-rental agency requesting my feedback on my experience with 
their services. Uber asked me to rate my driver. I spotted a How’s 
my driving? sticker (complete with a telephone number to call) 
on the bumper of a semitruck. I lost track of how many survey 
requests popped up on websites I visited. A casebook publisher 
invited me to participate in a focus group. Various restaurants, 
hotels, a doctor’s office, and yes, even the DMV, made customer 
comment cards available to me. A customs officer at an Asian 
airport asked me to tap either a smiley face or a frowny face on 
an electronic tablet to indicate my satisfaction with her service. 
My credit-card company solicited my feedback during an online 
chat. And upon returning to my vehicle after dining out, my ve-
hicle’s navigation system asked me to rate the restaurant. 
 
 24. See generally Robert A. Opoku, Gathering Customer Feedback Online 
and Swedish SMEs, 29 MGMT. RES. NEWS 106 (2006) (exploring and describing 
tools used by small- and medium-sized enterprises to collect customer feedback 
using internet-based tools); Scott E. Sampson, Gathering Customer Feedback 
Via the Internet: Instruments and Prospects, 98 INDUS. MGMT. & DATA SYS. 71 
(1998) (discussing various ways in which the internet has expanded firms’ abil-
ities to collect customer feedback). 
 25. AUDIENCE, http://www.theaudience.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2018). 
 26. SPROUT SOCIAL, http://sproutsocial.com (last visited Apr. 22, 2018). 
 27. How SurveyMonkey Gets Its Data, SURVEYMONKEY, https://www 
.surveymonkey.com/mp/survey-methodology (last visited Apr. 22, 2018). 
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The proliferation of customer feedback requests is troubling 
on a number of fronts, particularly its tendency to cause rater 
fatigue. Research shows that survey response rates peaked be-
tween 1960 and 1990 and have been falling precipitously ever 
since.28 Indeed, one study found that telephone survey coopera-
tion rates plunged from forty-three percent in 1997 to a mere 
fourteen percent in 2012.29 And online-survey response rates are 
even lower, with some studies showing participation rates aver-
aging a paltry two percent.30 Customers seem to be particularly 
weary of online surveys; nearly three-quarters report that sur-
veys interfered with the experience of a website, eighty percent 
admitted to abandoning a survey halfway through, and nearly 
two-thirds expressed a preference for giving feedback by actively 
reaching out.31 Even Fred Reichheld, inventor of a popular short 
consumer survey to test brand loyalty, thinks the customer feed-
back craze has gone too far, recently quipping: “The instant we 
have a technology to minimize surveys, I’m the first one on that 
bandwagon.”32 Rater fatigue has been shown to suppress re-
sponse rates, which in turn can affect the accuracy of the data.33 
Employers factor customer feedback into a vast array of 
business decisions, including employment-related decisions such 
as who to hire, promote, discipline, and fire; employees’ pay 
rates, bonuses, tips, and other remuneration; and work sched-
ules, job duties, and other assignments. One study found that 
about half of large U.S. companies include customer feedback in 
their incentive compensation.34 Moreover, in their influential 
qualitative study of how fifteen firms used customer feedback to 
 
 28. David Wheeler, The Rising Revolt Against Customer Surveys, WEEK 
(Sept. 30, 2015), http://theweek.com/articles/577882/rising-revolt-against 
-customer-surveys. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. See Lydia Dishman, Retailers: Your Surveys Are Making Customers 
Suffer, FORBES (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/lydiadishman/2014/ 
03/07/retailers-your-surveys-are-making-customers-suffer/#7a885956581a. 
 32. Jennifer Kaplan, The Inventor of Customer Satisfaction Surveys Is Sick 
of Them, Too, BLOOMBERG TECH. (May 4, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2016-05-04/tasty-taco-helpful-hygienist-are-all-those-surveys-of 
-any-use. 
 33. See, e.g., Stephen R. Porter et al., Multiple Surveys of Students and Sur-
vey Fatigue, 2004 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL RES. 63 (finding that 
administering multiple surveys to students in one academic year significantly 
reduced response rates in later surveys). 
 34. See Jeff Marr, Tying Employee Compensation to Customer Feedback: It 
Really Works!, CUSTOMER THINK (Apr. 23, 2006), http://customerthink.com/ 
tying_employee_compensation_to_customer_feedback. 
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manage their employees, Linda Fuller and Vicki Smith found 
that on average, each firm utilized five different customer feed-
back mechanisms.35 They further discovered that every business 
they interviewed used feedback mechanisms that allowed cus-
tomers to identify specific employees,36 and that customers “re-
layed detailed information about individual employee’s [sic] be-
havior and attitudes” in response to questions such as: “Were 
your nurses concerned?,” “How was your salesperson’s appear-
ance?,” and “Was our employee quick and efficient at the cash 
register?”37 The researchers observed that “such detailed feed-
back about specific employees derived from customers was fun-
neled into employees’ personnel files and often used in bureau-
cratic systems of evaluation and discipline.”38 For instance, an 
insurance agency routed customer feedback into personnel files, 
“on the basis of which periodic quantitative performance reviews 
used to determine raises, promotions and the like were pre-
pared.”39 A supermarket chain inputted information about indi-
vidual employees from comment cards and customer-initiated 
letters into electronic employee files that supervisors subse-
quently factored into annual employee performance reviews.40 
Interestingly, a car-dealership manager threw away comment 
cards containing positive feedback; he saved the negative ones 
“for later” and also used summary statistics from monthly cus-
tomer surveys to pinpoint employees whose numbers deviated 
substantially from the norm.41 And, finally, a union official rep-
resenting grocery workers reported that managers used cus-
tomer feedback both to initiate the first stages of disciplinary ac-
tion, such as verbal and written warnings, and for “temporary 
suspensions and on-the-spot terminations.”42 
The fact that employers rely on customer feedback to make 
employment decisions is significant because such decisions con-
stitute “employment actions” under Title VII and other antidis-
crimination laws.43 This means an employer can be held liable if 
 
 35. Linda Fuller & Vicki Smith, Consumers’ Reports: Management by Cus-
tomers in a Changing Economy, 5 WORK, EMP. & SOC. 1, 5 (1991). 
 36. Id. at 6–7. 
 37. Id. at 7. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 7–8. 
 40. Id. at 8. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 
135 S. Ct. 2507, 2533 (2015) (“[Title VII] makes it unlawful for an employer to 
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a protected characteristic motivates the decision and the em-
ployee suffers an adverse impact as a result.44 One may question 
the fairness of holding employers exclusively liable in such in-
stances, given it is the customer rather than the employer who 
bears the discriminatory animus.45 But even within this frame-
work of exclusive employer liability there exists the potential to 
make employer liability for customer feedback discrimination 
more commensurate with an employer’s level of culpability. 
II.  THE PERILS OF CUSTOMER FEEDBACK   
Given the prevalence of customer feedback and the high 
value companies place on it, one might assume most customer 
feedback accurately and objectively reflects a customer’s experi-
ence. When gathered correctly, customer satisfaction data cer-
tainly can be used to enhance a firm’s performance.46 However, 
too often customer feedback is unreliable—either because of 
 
take a variety of adverse employment actions (such as failing or refusing to hire 
a job applicant or discharging an employee) ‘because of ’ religion [or other pro-
tected characteristics].”); Davis v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., L.P., 
651 F.3d 664, 677 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A] reduction in compensation is a materially 
adverse employment action.”); Kercado-Clymer v. City of Amsterdam, 
370 F. App’x 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2010) (explaining that the assignment of less de-
sirable duties may be considered an adverse employment action); Breaux v. City 
of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 2000) (“Adverse employment actions are 
discharges, demotions, refusals to hire, refusals to promote, and reprimands.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 44. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012); see also Tibbs v. Calvary United 
Methodist Church, 505 F. App’x 508, 515 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Title VII prohibits 
adverse employment actions if the employee’s race [or other protected charac-
teristic] was a motivating factor, even if other legitimate factors also motivated 
the employer ’s decision.”); Richardson v. Monitronics Int’l, Inc., 434 F.3d 327, 
333 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Title VII expressly prohibits adverse employment actions 
that are motivated in part by discrimination on the basis of sex, race, color, re-
ligion, or national origin.”). 
 45. Compare Einat Albin, A Worker-Employer-Customer Triangle: The Case 
of Tips, 40 INDUS. L.J. 181, 182, 186–89 (2011) (asserting that customers have, 
in effect, become second employers in many cases because of employers’ in-
creased reliance on customer feedback to make employment decisions; as such, 
perhaps they should share responsibility for discrimination), with Katharine T. 
Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 IOWA L. REV. 223, 
228–39 (2016) (suggesting the law does not hold customers accountable for their 
discrimination against employees because it is more effective to hold employers 
liable for such discrimination and out of concern for customers’ personal auton-
omy and privacy). 
 46. See generally JANELLE BARLOW & CLAUS MØLLER, A COMPLAINT IS A 
GIFT (1996); Sunil Gupta & Valarie Zeithaml, Customer Metrics and Their Im-
pact on Financial Performance, 25 MARKETING SCI. 718 (2006); Neil A. Morgan 
& Lopo Leotte Rego, The Value of Different Customer Satisfaction and Loyalty 
Metrics in Predicting Business Performance, 25 MARKETING SCI. 426 (2006). 
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flaws in the methodologies by which firms collect the data or be-
cause respondents consciously or unconsciously permit biases to 
skew their responses. Whatever the reason, employers would be 
wise to exercise extreme caution before factoring customer feed-
back into employment decisions. 
A. METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES 
When customer feedback started becoming an important 
business tool in the mid-twentieth century, few employers 
stopped to question its reliability; instead, they seemed to adopt 
the mantra that any feedback was good feedback.47 However, in 
recent years numerous studies have revealed widespread and se-
vere methodological flaws associated with customer feedback. 
For example, Jonathan Barsky and Stephen Huxley argue that 
many customer satisfaction surveys are of “dubious value” be-
cause they typically are conducted without regard for who takes 
part or the motivation for participating, and thus are susceptible 
to nonresponse bias, meaning the respondents differ in meaning-
ful ways from nonrespondents.48 Feedback instruments also are 
often poorly designed, which can lead to content-validity prob-
lems because the instruments “are inadequate for measuring 
what they are supposed to measure.”49 For instance, a 2016 anal-
ysis of customer feedback tools used by the fifty-one largest U.S. 
retailers found the majority to be “critically flawed” and “riddled 
with information biases.”50 Based on an objective evaluation of 
fifteen elements, the average survey scored just forty-three out 
of one hundred points.51 The study also found that most of the 
surveys were excessively long, nearly one-third of the questions 
led customers to give answers the retailer wanted to hear, and 
 
 47. See Rob Brogle, How to Avoid the Evils Within Customer Satisfaction 
Surveys, ISIXSIGMA, https://www.isixsigma.com/methodology/voc-customer 
-focus/how-to-avoid-the-evils-within-customer-satisfaction-surveys (last visited 
Apr. 22, 2018) (“[As] [c]ompanies jumped on the survey bandwagon . . . there 
was no limit to the misunderstanding, abuse, wrong interpretations, wasted re-
sources, poor management and employee dissatisfaction that would result from 
these surveys. Although some companies were savvy enough to understand and 
properly interpret their survey results, the majority of companies did not.”). 
 48. Jonathan D. Barsky & Stephen J. Huxley, A Customer-Survey Tool: Us-
ing the “Quality Sample,” 33 CORNELL HOSPITALITY & RESTAURANT ADMIN. 
Q. 18, 18–19 (1992). 
 49. Id. at 19. 
 50. INTERACTION METRICS, 2016 FINDINGS REPORT: THE STATE OF POP RE-
TAIL SURVEYS, (Nov. 27, 2017), http://interactionmetrics.com/Point-of-Purchase 
-Survey-Study/Report.pdf. 
 51. Id. 
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sixty-three percent of surveys had at least one scale that either 
lacked a numerical midpoint or used labels that favored toward 
the positive.52 
While a full rendering of the methodological inadequacies of 
customer feedback is beyond the scope of this Article, three stud-
ies highlight some of the more common pitfalls. Moses Altsech’s 
analysis of sixty-three medical patient satisfaction surveys 
found “serious and fundamental flaws in the questions and 
measurement scales embedded in a considerable number of sur-
vey instruments.”53 For instance, seventy-one percent of the sur-
veys contained double-barreled questions, which ask about mul-
tiple constructs in the same question but only provide a single 
measurement scale to assess the multiple constructs.54 When re-
spondents are confronted with double-barreled questions, they 
sometimes report an average of the multiple ratings, or report 
their rating on the construct they consider most important, or do 
not respond at all.55 The study likewise found that fifty-seven 
percent of patient satisfaction surveys used Likert scales with 
nonneutral midpoints.56 Likert scales typically have five to 
seven points, one of which is a midpoint denoting neutral or av-
erage judgment, surrounded by equal numbers of negative and 
positive points.57 According to Altsech, a Likert scale with a 
nonneutral midpoint can skew feedback by forcing a respondent 
who intends to give an “average” rating to give an artificially 
high or low rating instead.58 
Kenneth Bartkus and colleagues discovered a number of 
methodological defects in their analysis of guest comment cards 
from sixty-three major U.S. lodging chains.59 Over half of the 
comment cards lacked a satisfactory secure-return mechanism, 
such as a locked drop box or postage-paid mail.60 By far, the most 
common return method (31.7%) was simply to leave the card at 
 
 52. Id. 
 53. Moses Altsech, Back to Square One: How Patient Satisfaction Survey 
Flaws Bias Assessments of Health Care Quality, ATHENS INST. FOR EDUC. & 
RES. 1, 9 (2012), https://www.atiner.gr/papers/BUS2012-0032.pdf. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. 
 59. See Kenneth R. Bartkus et al., The Quality of Guest Comment Cards, 
48 J. TRAVEL RES. 162 (2009). 
 60. Id. at 169. 
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the front desk where it was susceptible to tampering from em-
ployees.61 Other common flaws in the comment cards included 
biased introductory statements, not asking for the respondent’s 
email address, overuse of closed-ended questions, lack of writing 
space for open comments, imprecise question wording, and un-
balanced response options.62 
Sampling bias is another common problem with customer 
feedback, not only because participation by the customer is vol-
untary (thus opening the door to nonresponse bias) but also be-
cause of the ways customers are selected to provide feedback. 
Yaniv Poria’s study of hotel employees in the United Kingdom 
and Israel found a number of factors influenced employees’ devi-
ation from unbiased sampling procedures in how they distrib-
uted guest satisfaction questionnaires, including their accessi-
bility to guests, their perceptions of management reaction and 
its magnitude if employees’ names were mentioned in the guest’s 
comments, their perception of the importance of the data gath-
ered, and whether the employees perceived the questionnaire as 
a tool to pacify an agitated guest.63 
B. COGNITIVE BIASES 
Customer feedback is also problematic inasmuch as it ulti-
mately consists of subjective judgments that are vulnerable to a 
wide range of biases. Such biases may include “the ‘bandwagon 
effect,’ confirmation of preexisting beliefs, education or cognitive 
ability, and stereotypes based on the race or gender of the person 
being rated.”64 Customer feedback is likewise susceptible to the 
halo effect, a cognitive bias in which a respondent’s overall im-
pression of a person influences the respondent’s thoughts and 
feelings about the person’s character.65 Halo-contaminated data 
“can undermine the interpretability of attribute-specific satisfac-
tion data, obscure the identification of the strengths and weak-
 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 169–72. 
 63. Yaniv Poria, Employees’ Interference with the Distribution of Guest Sat-
isfaction Questionnaires, 16 INT’L J. CONTEMP. HOSPITALITY MGMT. 321, 322–
23 (2004). 
 64. David R. Hekman et al., An Examination of Whether and How Racial 
and Gender Biases Influence Customer Satisfaction, 53 ACAD. MGMT. J. 238, 
238–39 (2010). 
 65. Edward L. Thorndike, A Constant Error in Psychological Ratings, 4 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 25, 25 (1920). 
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nesses, and make attribute-specific comparisons across compet-
ing brands and products unreliable.”66 The danger of such biases 
skewing customers’ judgments is compounded by the fact that 
many raters are naïve, inexperienced, and are not held account-
able for the accuracy of their ratings.67 Moreover, customer feed-
back is often anonymous, which not only decreases accountabil-
ity but also suppresses “the desire to engage in the effortful 
cognitive processing required to conceal or overcome any bi-
ases.”68 
While any cognitive bias may compromise the validity of 
customer feedback, only those based on race, sex, or some other 
protected trait have the potential to expose employers to liability 
for discrimination. Sometimes such impermissible biases are 
easy to spot because they are overt, intentional, and explicit. For 
instance, in an Urbanspoon review of the Atomic Grill in Mor-
gantown, West Virginia, a patron requested that the servers 
show “more skin.”69 In Harrisonburg, Virginia, a couple dining 
at a luncheonette refused to leave a tip for their Latina waitress 
and instead wrote across the bottom of the receipt, “We only tip 
 
 66. Jochen Wirtz, Halo in Customer Satisfaction Measures, 14 INT’L J. 
SERV. INDUSTRY MGMT. 96, 96 (2003). 
 67. Hekman et al., supra note 64, at 239. See generally Elaine D. Pulakos 
et al., Examination of Race and Sex Effects on Performance Ratings, 74 J. AP-
PLIED PSYCHOL. 770 (1989) (examining the effects of race and sex on perfor-
mance evaluation ratings for first-term Army soldiers); Tim J. Wilkinson & Syl-
vie Fontaine, Patients’ Global Ratings of Student Competence: Unreliable 
Contamination or Gold Standard, 36 MED. EDUC. 1117 (2002) (determining that 
global ratings by medical patients are a valid and reliable assessment of medical 
students’ clinical skills, but that this is achieved by controlling the context and 
questions of surveys); David J. Woehr & Sylvia G. Roch, Context Effects in Per-
formance Evaluation: The Impact of Ratee Gender and Performance Level on 
Performance Ratings and Behavioral Recall, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 31 (1996) (finding significant differences in overall 
performance ratings as a result of ratee sex and context factors). 
 68. Hekman et al., supra note 64, at 240; see also Jennifer S. Lerner & Phil-
lip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. 
BULL. 255 (1999) (reviewing the impact of accountability on social judgments 
and choices); Wendy L. Richman et al., A Meta-Analytic Study of Social Desira-
bility Distortion in Computer-Administered Questionnaires, Traditional Ques-
tionnaires, and Interviews, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 754 (1999) (offering an anal-
ysis of social desirability distortions between computer, traditional paper-and-
pencil questionnaires, and face-to-face interviews). 
 69. Anna Breslaw, One Restaurant’s Unbelievable Response to a Sexist Cus-
tomer Comment, COSMOPOLITAN (May 21, 2014), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/ 
food-cocktails/news/a25556/restaurant-more-skin-comment. In response to the 
sexist feedback, the restaurant offered a seven-dollar potato skin special and 
donated all proceeds to the West Virginia Foundation for Rape Information Ser-
vices. Id. 
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citizens.”70 And in Cleveland, Ohio, a university dining hall 
worker found a comment card that read, “There are a lot of black 
people working here. I hope it’s just for Black History Month. 
Signed, the KKK.”71 While overtly discriminatory customer feed-
back typically is anonymous, that’s not always the case. For ex-
ample, a father in Michigan told a hospital supervisor that he 
did not want any black nurses caring for his baby;72 a medical 
center in Baltimore, Maryland, demanded that a security staff-
ing company provide only male security guards;73 and even the 
federal government, by way of the National Security Agency, in-
sisted that an IT contractor reassign an employee to another cli-
ent for taking what it considered excessive leave to care for his 
sick wife.74 Although instances of overt discrimination seem to 
be less common in recent years, various commentators have ex-
pressed concern that blatant racism, sexism, and xenophobia 
may become more commonplace under the Trump Administra-
tion.75 
 
 70. Cleve R. Wootson Jr., This Couple Didn’t Tip Their Latina Server. They 
Left a Hateful Message Instead, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2016), https://www 
.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2016/08/21/this-couple-didnt-tip 
-their-latina-server-they-left-a-hateful-message-instead. 
 71. Gabrielle Buffington, Graffiti and Prejudiced Remarks Found in Fribley 
Commons Before Spring Break; Perpetrators Still Not Caught, OBSERVER (Mar. 
26, 2015), http://observer.case.edu/graffiti-and-prejudiced-remarks-found-in 
-fribley-commons-before-spring-break-perpetrators-still-not-caught. 
 72. Gary Ridley, Hurley Settles Race Discrimination Complaint That 
Claimed Black Nurses Were Banned from Treating White Baby in Flint, 
MLIVE.COM (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.mlive.com/news/flint/index.ssf/2013/ 
09/hurley_settles_race_discrimina.html. 
 73. Williams v. G4S Secure Sols. (USA), Inc., No.ELH-10-3476, 2012 WL 
1698282, at *2 (D. Md. May 11, 2012). 
 74. Sparenberg v. Eagle All., No. JFM-14-1667, 2015 WL 6122809, at *2 (D. 
Md. Oct. 15, 2015). 
 75. See, e.g., Laura Bates, Opinion, Trump’s Insults Embolden America’s 
Secret Sexists, CNN (Oct. 14, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/10/14/opinions/ 
trumps-insults-embolden-americas-secret-sexists-opinion-bates (“[Mr. Trump] 
is emboldening all those who secretly hold these [sexist] views at every turn. If 
he were elected, it would be a hugely powerful validation of these opinions and 
would risk securing them in societal acceptability for generations to come.”); 
Arun Gupta, How a Trump Presidency Would Unleash a Torrent of Racist Vio-
lence—and Devastate the Left, IN THESE TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016), http://www 
.inthesetimes.com/features/trump_presidency_would_devastate_the_left.html 
(warning that “a Trump victory would embolden white nationalists, giving them 
access to vast state power and resources and a White House that would down-
play or ignore their violent excesses”); What It’s Like to Be an American Muslim 
After Trump’s Election, NPR (Nov. 12, 2016), http://www.npr.org/2016/11/12/ 
501853599/what-its-like-to-be-an-american-muslim-after-trumps-election 
(quoting human rights lawyer Arsalan Iftikhar as he explains that he is “quite 
worried for the next four years when it comes to women and Hispanics and 
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Although we have made “considerable progress in reducing 
overt expressions of prejudice since the Civil Rights Movement 
of the 1960s,”76 this does not necessarily mean Americans are 
becoming less discriminatory; more likely, discrimination is be-
coming harder to detect. Indeed, “there is abundant social-psy-
chological evidence that biases against women and minorities 
persist in a more covert and non-conscious form”77—what re-
searchers often term “modern discrimination,”78 “aversive dis-
crimination,”79 “covert discrimination,”80 or “implicit bias.”81 
Samuel Gaertner and John Dovidio posit that as antidis-
crimination ideals become more firmly entrenched in American 
society, “many Whites who consciously, explicitly, and sincerely 
support egalitarian principles and believe themselves to be non-
prejudiced also harbor negative feelings and beliefs about Blacks 
and other historically disadvantaged groups.”82 They further ex-
plain that “The existence of both the conscious endorsement of 
egalitarian values and unconscious negative feelings toward 
Blacks makes aversive racists’ attitudes complex and produces a 
distinct pattern of discriminatory behavior.”83 Moreover, 
 
LGBT folks and people with disabilities, African-Americans and, of course, 
American Muslims, in terms of how this is going to affect their lives over the 
next four years under a Trump presidency” because Mr. Trump “has embold-
ened an entire subset of the American populace who now think it’s OK to bring 
Nazi flags to presidential rallies”). 
 76. Hekman et al., supra note 64, at 240. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See, e.g., V. Paul Poteat & Lisa B. Spanierman, Modern Racism Atti-
tudes Among White Students: The Role of Dominance and Authoritarianism and 
the Mediating Effects of Racial Color-Blindness, 152 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 758 
(2012). 
 79. See, e.g., Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, Understanding and 
Addressing Contemporary Racism: From Aversive Racism to the Common In-
group Identity Model, 61 J. SOC. ISSUES 615, 618 (2005). 
 80. See, e.g., Christopher L. Aberson et al., Covert Discrimination Against 
Gay Men by U.S. College Students, 139 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 323 (1999). 
 81. See, e.g., Erik J. Girvan, On Using the Psychological Science of Implicit 
Bias to Advance Anti-Discrimination Law, 26 GEO. MASON U. C.R.L.J. 1 (2015). 
 82. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 79; see also David Benjamin Oppenhei-
mer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 903 (1993) (“[Survey 
data shows] virtually all whites in American society now profess a commitment 
to nondiscrimination in employment.” However, the data also reveals a “consist-
ently high level of general racial prejudice,” signifying that “overt racism has 
lost favor socially, but racist attitudes lie close beneath the surface of our soci-
ety.”). 
 83. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 79, at 619; see also Charles R. Lawrence 
III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 322 (1987) (“Traditional notions of intent do not reflect 
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“Whereas old-fashioned racists exhibit a direct and overt pattern 
of discrimination, aversive racists’ actions may appear more var-
iable and inconsistent.”84 Significantly, because aversive racists 
consciously endorse egalitarian principles, “they will not dis-
criminate in situations with strong social norms when discrimi-
nation would be obvious to others and to themselves.”85 Instead, 
these unconscious feelings are expressed in “subtle, indirect, and 
rationalizable ways”—particularly “in situations in which nor-
mative structure is weak, when the guidelines for appropriate 
behavior are vague, or when the basis for social judgment is am-
biguous.”86 
Aversive discrimination often occurs when aversive racists 
“can justify or rationalize a negative response on the basis of 
some factor other than race,” such that they are able to engage 
in behaviors that harm a minority, “but in ways that allow them 
to maintain their self-image as nonprejudiced.”87 Customer feed-
back may be especially susceptible to this type of bias for the 
very reasons Gaertner and Dovidio articulate: the normative 
structure for feedback exchanges typically is weak or nonexist-
ent, because feedback tends to be anonymous and raters face no 
repercussions for their answers; the guidelines for appropriate 
rater behavior are often vague; the basis for social judgment is 
entirely ambiguous; and survey questions and other feedback 
mechanisms provide ample opportunity for a respondent to give 
an employee a poor rating ostensibly on the basis of some factor 
other than the employee’s protected characteristic. 
A growing body of research indicates customers both con-
sciously and unconsciously allow racist and sexual biases to ad-
versely affect their perceptions of service exchanges. David Hek-
man and colleagues conducted the most robust study on this 
question, demonstrating how rater bias impacted customer sat-
isfaction scores in three studies using different samples and 
methods.88 The first study analyzed over twelve thousand pa-
tient satisfaction ratings and found that even after controlling 
 
the fact that decisions about racial matters are influenced in large part by fac-
tors that can be characterized as neither intentional—in the sense that certain 
outcomes are self-consciously sought—nor unintentional—in the sense that the 
outcomes are random, fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the decision-maker ’s be-
liefs, desires, and wishes.”). 
 84. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 79, at 619. 
 85. Id. at 620. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See Hekman et al., supra note 64. 
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for objective measures of physician performance (productivity, 
accessibility, and quality), female and nonwhite physicians re-
ceived lower patient satisfaction scores than their male and 
white counterparts.89 In the second study, student raters ob-
served videos of an employee-customer interaction in a univer-
sity bookstore and were asked to evaluate the employee’s behav-
ior and to provide satisfaction judgments of the store 
environment.90 Different videos of the same scripted interaction 
were shown, with the only variance being in the employee’s race 
or sex.91 Importantly, each respondent also took two implicit as-
sociation tests (IATs), so the researchers could examine how im-
plicit biases impacted student rater evaluations.92 The study 
found that respondents rated employees and the organizational 
context as worse when observing the performance of female and 
nonwhite employees, especially if the respondent held implicit 
biases about the low-status group.93 The third study, which ex-
amined member satisfaction at sixty-six country clubs, found 
that objectively measured behaviors that benefitted members, 
such as the quality of the facilities, were positively related to sat-
isfaction, but only for facilities with low percentages of nonwhite 
and female employees.94 The findings from these three studies 
led Hekman and colleagues to conclude: 
  If these results are replicated and generalizable, they have signifi-
cant implications for organizational practice. If managers are serious 
about the fair treatment of their employees and the promotion of diver-
sity, they need to treat customer ratings differently. More specifically, 
the rating process can be changed by increasing information, responsi-
bility, or training for raters and by changing how customer ratings are 
used. In the latter context, organizations can perhaps measure and dis-
count such biases or statistically adjust the ratings to remove the bias. 
Without such actions, given the increasing dependence on customer 
ratings, society is not only likely to maintain existing levels of inequi-
table compensation and advancement for women and minorities, but 
also likely to increase these inequities. This outcome is unacceptable in 
a society that is committed legally, morally, and socially to fair treat-
ment for all in the workplace.95 
 
 89. Id. at 243–49. 
 90. Id. at 249. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 250. 
 93. Id. at 250–53. 
 94. Id. at 253–56. 
 95. Id. at 259. 
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Other researchers have found similar patterns of bias across 
a variety of settings. For instance, Dan Moshavi found that cus-
tomers rated their telephonic exchanges with customer-service 
representatives significantly higher if the representative was 
the opposite sex of the respondent.96 An analysis of customer sat-
isfaction scores from three hundred clients of an online-market-
ing firm found that all of the male client-service representatives 
had higher scores than all of the female client-service represent-
atives, even though the female marketers on average had higher 
producing accounts.97 In fact, all of the men on staff had above-
average scores, while all women had below-average scores, and 
the lowest scoring male representative had higher ratings than 
the top scoring female representative.98 Lillian MacNell and col-
leagues detected a similar pattern of discrimination in students’ 
ratings of their professors on teaching evaluations.99 In that 
study, assistant instructors in an online class each operated un-
der two different gender identities.100 Students rated the male 
identity significantly higher than the female identity, regardless 
of the instructor’s actual gender.101 Tombs and Hill’s study of 
customer reactions to different employee accents revealed that 
while hearing a foreign accent was not enough on its own to in-
fluence customer ratings, when the employee was incompetent 
or the customer was in a negative affective state, a foreign accent 
seemed to exacerbate the situation.102 
Customer bias likewise manifests itself in the judicial world. 
A 1993 study of over ten thousand Colorado attorneys’ ratings of 
the judges before whom they had appeared in the prior eighteen 
months found that female judges were rated significantly lower 
than male judges on a number of different attributes.103 One-
 
 96. Dan Moshavi, He Said, She Said: Gender Bias and Customer Satisfac-
tion with Phone-Based Service Encounters, 34 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 162, 
171 (2004). 
 97. See Bryce Covert, Female Client Service Reps Get Lower Scores Despite 
Better Performance and Experience, THINKPROGRESS (May 22, 2014), https:// 
www.thinkprogress.org/female-client-service-reps-get-lower-scores-despite 
-better-performance-and-experience-dfa457062f5c#.36ijmroyv. 
 98. Id. 
 99. See Lillian MacNell et al., What’s in a Name: Exposing Gender Bias in 
Student Ratings of Teachings, 40 INNOVATIVE HIGHER EDUC. 291, 301 (2015). 
 100. Id. at 296–97. 
 101. Id. at 301. 
 102. Alastair Tombs & Sally Rao Hill, The Effect of Service Employees’ Accent 
on Customer Reactions, 48 EUR. J. MARKETING 2051, 2062–65 (2014). 
 103. Joyce S. Sterling, The Impact of Gender Bias on Judging: Survey of At-
titudes Toward Women Judges, 22 COLO. LAW. 257, 257 (1993). 
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fourth of the attorneys recommended the female judges not be 
retained, whereas just thirteen percent recommended the male 
judges not be retained.104 Male attorneys ranked female judges 
lower than male judges on every attribute measured.105 Interest-
ingly, female attorneys ranked female judges as high as male 
judges on some attributes but significantly lower than male 
judges on several others, including compassion, courtesy, satis-
factory performance as a motions judge, satisfactory perfor-
mance as a settlement judge, and overall rating.106 More than 
two decades later, female judges still appear to be evaluated 
more harshly because of their sex. Gill’s 2014 study of judicial 
performance evaluations from Clark County, Nevada, found that 
female and nonwhite judges were rated significantly lower by 
attorneys, even after controlling for job performance.107 
Lastly, a number of studies have shown customers discrim-
inate against black service employees in how much they tip 
them—a different, perhaps more honest, form of feedback. Ian 
Ayres and colleagues’ analysis of more than one thousand tips to 
taxicab drivers in New Haven, Connecticut, found that black 
drivers on average were tipped nearly one-third less than their 
white counterparts and were also eighty percent more likely 
than white drivers to receive no tip at all.108 Michael Lynn and 
colleagues’ examination of 140 tips given to restaurant workers 
in a southern region of the United States showed that both white 
and black diners tipped black servers less than white servers, 
even after controlling for the diners’ rating of service.109 Brew-
ster and Lynn’s subsequent study of over five hundred restau-
rant diners in a northern U.S. city detected this same pattern of 
discrimination against black servers.110 
In short, there can be no doubt customer feedback plays a 
vital role in today’s service economy. But its utility is often un-
dermined both by serious methodological shortcomings in how 
 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Rebecca D. Gill, Implicit Bias in Judicial Performance Evaluations: We 
Must Do Better Than This, 35 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 289–91 (2014). 
 108. Ian Ayres et al., To Insure Prejudice: Racial Disparities in Taxicab Tip-
ping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613, 1616 (2005). 
 109. Michael Lynn et al., Consumer Racial Discrimination in Tipping: A 
Replication and Extension, 38 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1045, 1054–55 (2008). 
 110. Zachary W. Brewster & Michael Lynn, Black-White Earnings Gap 
Among Restaurant Servers: A Replication, Extension, and Exploration of Con-
sumer Racial Discrimination in Tipping, 84 SOC. INQUIRY 545, 557–61 (2014). 
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the data is collected and generated, as well as by conscious and 
unconscious cognitive biases that skew customer ratings. Alt-
hough the former is troubling in its own right, the latter is of 
more serious concern, inasmuch as biased feedback can subject 
employees to discrimination based on protected traits while also 
exposing employers to costly litigation. 
III.  CUSTOMER FEEDBACK DISCRIMINATION WITHIN 
EXISTING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS   
As other commentators have noted, the courts have not di-
rectly addressed employers’ use of discriminatory customer feed-
back.111 That is not to say customer feedback discrimination is 
not a serious problem. We know firms are soliciting feedback 
from customers at unprecedented rates, that much of that feed-
back is either intentionally or unintentionally biased, and that 
such feedback regularly factors into employment decisions.112 So 
then, why the dearth of lawsuits? I argue in this Part that the 
answer lies, at least partially, in the difficulty of litigating cus-
tomer feedback discrimination claims within existing legal 
frameworks. Returning to our introductory hypothetical, Dr. 
Flowers has two options for proving the medical clinic termi-
nated her employment because of her sex.113 She either must 
prove disparate treatment (i.e., that the clinic’s discrimination 
was intentional; its use of patient satisfaction ratings was pre-
text for discrimination) or disparate impact (i.e., that even if the 
clinic’s decision was facially neutral, it had a discriminatory im-
pact on women). In this Part, I explain why the disparate treat-
ment and disparate impact frameworks are unappealing and 
may, in fact, deter victims of discrimination from pursuing their 
claims. I further contend that these frameworks do not properly 
incentivize employers to guard against customer feedback dis-
crimination. 
 
 111. See Wang, supra note 4, at 285 (“While the use of customer feedback to 
manage employees appears to be both widespread and problematic, it is not one 
that employment discrimination law has yet addressed.”); Zatz, supra note 3, at 
1417 (“No published decision is precisely on point . . . .”). 
 112. See supra Parts I, II.B. 
 113. See EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2028, 2032 
(2015) (explaining that disparate treatment and disparate impact “are the only 
causes of action under Title VII”); Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 
1033, 1041 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Under Title VII, discrimination can be demonstrated 
through evidence of either ‘disparate treatment’ or ‘disparate impact.’”). 
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A. DISPARATE TREATMENT 
Discrimination that is intentional is analyzed under a dis-
parate treatment theory of discrimination.114 To prevail on a dis-
parate treatment claim, a plaintiff must prove her employer dis-
criminated against her “because of” a protected trait.115 The 
protected trait need not be the sole reason for the termination; 
alternatively, a plaintiff can prevail by showing the protected 
trait “was a motivating factor” in the employment decision.116 
How a plaintiff goes about proving disparate treatment depends 
on the type of evidence she possesses to support her claim. A 
plaintiff can prove disparate treatment through direct or circum-
stantial evidence.117 “Direct evidence of discrimination is ‘evi-
dence which, if believed, would prove the existence of a fact [in 
issue] without inference or presumption.’”118 Direct evidence re-
quires a statement of discriminatory intent by a person involved 
in the adverse action, such as “a woman was not competent 
enough to do this job” or “we can’t have women in manage-
ment.”119 
Because direct evidence of discrimination is rare,120 plain-
tiffs ordinarily attempt to prove their claims through circum-
stantial evidence, using a three-part burden shifting analysis 
known as the McDonnell Douglas test.121 This analytical model, 
 
 114. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009) (explaining that inten-
tional discrimination is known as disparate treatment). 
 115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 116. Id. § 2000e-2(m). 
 117. See Presley v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 675 F. App’x 507, 512 (6th 
Cir. 2017) (“To establish a discrimination claim under Title VII, plaintiffs must 
present either direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination . . . .”). 
 118. Horne v. Turner Constr. Co., 136 F. App’x 289, 292 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(quoting Earley v. Champion Int’l Corp., 907 F.2d 1077, 1081 (11th Cir. 1990)); 
see also McNulty v. Citadel Broad. Co., 58 F. App’x 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Di-
rect evidence means ‘evidence sufficient to allow the jury to find that the “deci-
sion makers placed substantial negative reliance on [the plaintiff ’s age] in 
reaching their decision to fire him.”’” (quoting Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., 308 F.3d 
335, 337–38 (3d Cir. 2002))). 
 119. Horne, 136 F. App’x at 292. 
 120. See Boss v. Castro, 816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Direct evidence—
an overt admission of discriminatory intent—is rare . . . .”); Sardina v. United 
Parcel Serv., Inc., 254 F. App’x 108, 109 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[D]irect evidence of 
discriminatory intent is rare and such intent often must be inferred from cir-
cumstantial evidence . . . .”). 
 121. See Sullivan v. Worley Catastrophe Servs., L.L.C., 591 F. App’x 243, 
245–46 (5th Cir. 2014) (“Since ‘direct evidence of discrimination is rare, the Su-
preme Court has devised an evidentiary procedure that allocates the burden of 
production and establishes an orderly presentation of proof in discrimination 
cases.’” (quoting Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 
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announced by the Supreme Court in 1973,122 involves three dis-
tinct steps: (1) the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case 
of discrimination; (2) the defendant employer must then offer a 
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employ-
ment action; whereafter (3) the plaintiff must show the em-
ployer’s proffered reason was pretext for discrimination.123 In 
mixed-motive cases, there is often a fourth step: “If a plaintiff 
demonstrates that [the protected trait] was a motivating factor 
in the employment decision, it then falls to the defendant to 
prove ‘that the same adverse employment decision would have 
been made regardless of discriminatory animus.’”124 Whereas 
the second and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas test are 
fairly straightforward, “[t]he proof necessary to establish a 
prima facie case . . . is flexible and varies with the specific facts 
of each case.”125 In a discriminatory discharge case such as Dr. 
Flowers’s, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie case generally 
by showing that (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was 
performing her duties satisfactorily; (3) she was discharged; and 
(4) the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an 
inference of discrimination.126 
Although the courts have made clear that disparate treat-
ment must be intentional on the employer’s part,127 neither the 
 
1996))); EEOC v. Liberal R-II Sch. Dist., 314 F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 2002) (“The 
McDonnell Douglas analytical framework using circumstantial evidence has de-
veloped because direct evidence of discrimination is rare.”). 
 122. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800–04 (1973). 
 123. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 49–50 n.3 (2003) (“Under 
McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action. If the employer meets this 
burden, the presumption of intentional discrimination disappears, but the 
plaintiff can still prove disparate treatment by, for instance, offering evidence 
demonstrating that the employer ’s explanation is pretextual.” (internal citation 
omitted)).  
 124. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004) (quot-
ing Rishel v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F. Supp. 2d 854, 865 (M.D.N.C. 
2003)). 
 125. Maziarka v. Mills Fleet Farm, Inc., 245 F.3d 675, 679 (8th Cir. 2001); 
see also Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 (stating that 
McDonnell Douglas created a flexible standard for plaintiffs to establish a prima 
facie case of discrimination that may be modified to fit the facts of a case). 
 126. See Grant v. City of Blytheville, 841 F.3d 767, 773–74 (8th Cir. 2016); 
Kirkland v. Cablevision Sys., 760 F.3d 223, 225 (2d Cir. 2014); Barlow v. C.R. 
Eng., Inc., 703 F.3d 497, 505 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 127. EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 852 F.3d 1018, 1024 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(“To prevail on a disparate treatment claim, a Title VII plaintiff must demon-
strate that an employer intentionally discriminated against her on the basis of 
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language of Title VII nor the McDonnell Douglas test explicitly 
requires a showing of intentionality. Whether and how a plaintiff 
must show an employer intentionally discriminated is crucial in 
the context of customer feedback discrimination. If an employer 
could only be liable for disparate treatment if it consciously fac-
tors biased feedback into an employment decision, the employer 
would have to actually know the feedback was biased and decide 
to use it anyway. Thus the employer could avoid liability, and 
freely use feedback that is just as prejudicial to an employee, so 
long as the bias is implicit or otherwise unknown to the em-
ployer. Deborah Brake rightly asserts that uncertainty about 
whether disparate treatment must be conscious to be intentional 
stems from ambiguity in the statutory text itself, which simply 
prohibits discrimination “because of”128 or motivated by129 a pro-
tected trait: 
The statute could plausibly be read [as permitting disparate treatment 
claims based on unconscious discrimination]. Nowhere does the text 
limit the statute’s reach to intentionally biased decision making in cod-
ifying the unlawful employment practices. Rather, the statutory lan-
guage simply bars employers from discriminating “because of such in-
dividual’s” race or sex. If “because of” denotes causation-in-fact, an 
employment decision that is made based in whole or in part on the em-
ployee’s sex or race would violate the statute regardless of whether the 
actor deliberately relied on the discriminatory reason, as long as that 
is in fact what occurred. 
  And yet, this is not the only plausible reading of the statutory text. 
An alternative reading is that the term “discriminate” . . . implicitly 
incorporates a requirement that the decision maker acted intention-
ally, so that discrimination is understood to involve the actor ’s con-
scious awareness of the reason for the decision.130 
While scholars are somewhat divided over whether dispar-
ate treatment reaches implicit bias,131 I agree with Brake that 
 
a protected characteristic.”); Ray v. Ropes & Gray LLP, 799 F.3d 99, 112 (1st 
Cir. 2015) (“To successfully establish a Title VII disparate treatment claim, [the 
plaintiff ] must show that he suffered intentional discrimination.”); HDC, LLC 
v. City of Ann Arbor, 675 F.3d 608, 612 (6th Cir. 2012) (“To prevail on a dispar-
ate treatment claim, a plaintiff must show proof of intentional discrimination.”); 
Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 699–700 (1st Cir. 1999) (“The linchpin of 
a disparate treatment claim is proof of the employer ’s discriminatory motive. 
Not so a claim of disparate impact . . . .” (internal citation omitted)). 
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
 129. Id. § 2000e-2(m). 
 130. Deborah Brake, The Shifting Sands of Employment Discrimination: 
From Unjustified Impact to Disparate Treatment in Pregnancy and Pay, 
105 GEO. L.J. 559, 571 (2017). 
 131. Compare Christopher Cerullo, Everyone’s a Little Bit Racist? Reconcil-
ing Implicit Bias and Title VII, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 127, 155–61 (2013), Melissa 
Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. 
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the courts appear to be “increasingly wedded to a conception of 
the disparate treatment claim as predicated on the decision 
maker’s conscious reliance on a discriminatory reason.”132 This 
is evident from courts’ repeated assertion that disparate treat-
ment claims involve intentional discrimination, whereas dispar-
ate impact involves unintentional discrimination.133 Addition-
ally, the Supreme Court itself insinuated, in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, that an employer intentionally discriminates only if it 
acts with a conscious discriminatory intent or motive: 
  In saying that gender played a motivating part in an employment 
decision, we mean that, if we asked the employer at the moment of the 
decision what its reasons were and if we received a truthful response, 
one of those reasons would be that the applicant or employee was a 
woman.134 
The Court’s reasoning suggests that whether an employer inten-
tionally discriminates depends on if the employer knows at the 
time of the employment decision that a protected trait motivated 
the action. Thus, if the employment decision had been uncon-
sciously motivated by the protected trait, the employer could not 
have intentionally discriminated. More recently, as Brake points 
out, the Court in Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 
 
REV. 741, 757, 771 (2005), Michael Selmi, Response to Professor Wax: Discrimi-
nation as Accident: Old Whine, New Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233, 1237 (1999), and 
Patrick S. Shin, Liability for Unconscious Discrimination? A Thought Experi-
ment in the Theory of Employment Discrimination Law, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 67, 
100–01 (2010), with Amy Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 
1146–49 (1999) (arguing that the current doctrine is formally at odds with lia-
bility for unconscious forms of disparate treatment). 
 132. Brake, supra note 130, at 572; see also Linda Hamilton Krieger, The 
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and 
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1172 (1995) (arguing 
that, in disparate treatment cases, “liability is premised on the presence of con-
scious discriminatory animus”). 
 133. See, e.g., EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th 
Cir. 2002) (referring to intentional discrimination as disparate treatment and 
unintentional discrimination as disparate impact); Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 
118 F.3d 1400, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[C]ourts have found it useful to distin-
guish between intentional discrimination, often labeled as ‘disparate treat-
ment,’ and unintentional or incidental discrimination, labeled as ‘disparate im-
pact.’”); Brown v. Ameriprise Fin. Servs., Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 971, 976 (D. 
Minn. 2010) (“[D]isparate treatment involves intentional discrimination against 
an individual (or group of individuals), while disparate impact involves unin-
tentional discrimination.”); Save Mart Supermarkets v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s 
London, 843 F. Supp. 597, 606 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (“The issue before this Court is 
whether claims of disparate impact (unintentional), as well as disparate treat-
ment (intentional), discrimination are barred from coverage . . . .”). 
 134. 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (emphasis added). 
 2018] CUSTOMER FEEDBACK DISCRIMINATION 2195 
 
“equated pay discrimination with the employer’s deliberate de-
cision to pay a woman less because of her sex,” and in Wal-mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes the Court expressed “skepticism of the 
plaintiffs’ assertion [that] a common policy of discrimination was 
fueled by an implicit understanding of discrimination as a con-
scious, and thereby rare, phenomenon.”135 Brake further con-
tends that even though the Court did not make intentionality an 
explicit element of the McDonnell Douglas test, the test itself “is 
predicated on a working assumption that the employer knew re-
gardless of whether it relied on a discriminatory reason.”136 This 
assumption is evidenced by the fact that “proof of the falsity of 
the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason supports 
an inference of discrimination because it supports an inference 
that the employer knowingly lied to cover up its real (and by im-
plication, deliberate) discriminatory reason.”137 
Either interpretation of the statutory text seems anathema 
to properly allocating liability for employment decisions based 
on biased customer feedback. On the one hand, if Title VII only 
prohibits intentional discrimination that is conscious, this would 
seem to foreclose the possibility of an employer being liable for 
using anything other than the most explicitly and obviously dis-
criminatory customer feedback. This seems contrary to Title 
VII’s plain intent.138 What incentive would an employer have to 
carefully scrutinize feedback for bias if ignorance is bliss? In-
deed, what would keep an employer from relying exclusively on 
quantitative customer feedback, from which bias cannot be eas-
ily ascertained, as a way to insulate itself from liability? On the 
other hand, a broad reading of Title VII that would subject em-
ployers to liability for the slightest trace of implicit bias in a sin-
gle customer satisfaction survey seems heavy handed, unrealis-
tic, and overly punitive. Can it really be said that an employer 
intentionally discriminates when it factors into an employment 
 
 135. Brake, supra note 130, at 571–72. 
 136. Id. at 572–73. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 26 (1963), as reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 (“The purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate, through 
the utilization of formal and informal remedial procedures, discrimination in 
employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin.”); 110 CONG. REC. 
13,079–80 (1964) (statement of Sen. Clark) (similar); see also McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“The language of Title VII makes 
plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities 
and to eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered 
. . . stratified job environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.”). 
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decision facially neutral feedback that is tainted by hidden bias 
that only a skilled social scientist could detect? 
To understand how courts might analyze customer feedback 
discrimination claims under a disparate treatment framework, 
it is helpful to divide such claims into three categories: (1) claims 
in which the bias is intentional and known to the employer; 
(2) claims in which bias is intentional but unknown to the em-
ployer; and (3) claims in which bias is unintentional and un-
known to the employer. 
1. Intentional and Known Bias 
The case law is most helpful in predicting how a court would 
analyze a customer feedback discrimination claim where the 
feedback is intentionally biased and the employer is aware of the 
bias but uses the feedback anyway. It seems clear that in such 
cases the employer could—and should—be liable. Customer pref-
erence cases are instructive, if not perfectly analogous, in this 
regard. These cases typically involve customer requests or de-
mands that would require an employer to discriminate against 
its workforce; in turn, the employer acquiesces to keep the cus-
tomer happy.139 What makes these cases intellectually interest-
ing is that, as with customer feedback discrimination, it is the 
customer, not the employer, who possesses the discriminatory 
animus. Even so, the courts have been clear that this does not 
exculpate the employer from liability in most instances. For ex-
ample, in Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., the Fifth 
Circuit held that Pan Am’s policy of hiring only women as flight 
attendants because its passengers “overwhelmingly preferred to 
be served by female stewardesses” constituted impermissible 
discrimination under Title VII.140 The court explained that alt-
hough its decision “may cause some initial difficulty” for the air-
line, “it would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the pref-
erences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether 
the sex discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large ex-
tent, these very prejudices the Act was meant to overcome.”141 
The Diaz court was not alone in holding an employer liable 
for catering to customers’ discriminatory preferences. In Chaney 
 
 139. See, e.g., Chaney v. Plainfield Healthcare Ctr., 612 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 
2010); Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971); Wil-
liams v. G4S Secure Solutions (USA), Inc., No. ELH-10-3476, 2012 WL 1698282 
(D. Md. May 11, 2012). 
 140. 442 F.2d at 387–89. 
 141. Id. at 389. 
 2018] CUSTOMER FEEDBACK DISCRIMINATION 2197 
 
v. Plainfield Healthcare Center, the Seventh Circuit reversed 
summary judgment for a nursing home that assigned a black 
employee different job duties because certain residents refused 
to be treated by black nurses.142 In so doing, the court declared, 
“It is now widely accepted that a company’s desire to cater to the 
perceived racial preferences of its customers is not a defense un-
der Title VII for treating employees differently based on race.”143 
In Silver v. North Shore University Hospital, the district court 
denied summary judgment to a hospital that terminated a fifty-
nine-year-old scientist based on its perception that outside 
sources would not give funding to older employees.144 In Olsen v. 
Marriott International, Inc., the district court denied Marriott 
summary judgment on a claim that it unlawfully refused to hire 
a male massage therapist based on its clientele’s preference for 
females.145 And in Hylind v. Xerox Corp., the district court de-
nied summary judgment to an employer accused of assigning a 
female employee to a less desirable sales account because it be-
lieved the client was attracted to her.146 
The courts have stopped short of declaring that discrimina-
tory customer preferences can never legally factor into employ-
ment decisions. Employers have found modest success in cases 
where customers’ discriminatory preferences were rooted in pri-
vacy147 or safety148 concerns. For instance, in Wade v. Napoli-
tano, the district court granted summary judgment to the Trans-
portation Security Administration on a claim that it engaged in 
 
 142. 612 F.3d at 912–15. 
 143. Id. at 913. 
 144. 490 F. Supp. 2d 354, 365 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). 
 145. 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052, 1063–68 (D. Ariz. 1999). 
 146. 380 F. Supp. 2d 705, 716–18 (D. Md. 2005), aff ’d, 481 F. App’x 819 (4th 
Cir. 2012). 
 147. See, e.g., Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 
1996) (childcare specialists); Jones v. Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. 
Miss. 1987) (catheterization and other intimate services provided to male pa-
tients by nurse’s aides); Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 
(N.D. Ill. 1984) (washroom attendants); Brooks v. ACF Indus., Inc., 537 
F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (janitors cleaning bathhouses and re-
strooms); Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981), va-
cated on other grounds, 671 F.2d. 1100 (8th Cir. 1982) (nurses in obstetrics unit 
of hospital where intimate procedures performed and female body and genitalia 
routinely exposed). 
 148. See, e.g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984) 
(upholding a policy prohibiting pregnant flight attendants from working on 
flights because of the safety concerns created for passengers if pregnant flight 
attendants could not properly perform their roles in emergency situations); Har-
riss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980) (same). 
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sex discrimination by requiring that one-third of its screeners be 
female.149 The court found sex to constitute a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification (BFOQ), and therefore a complete defense to 
the discrimination claim, after customer satisfaction surveys  
revealed that the same-gender screening procedures met the public’s 
expectations . . . [while] further[ing] TSA’s ultimate objective of provid-
ing security as the TSA found that if passengers are more comfortable 
with how searches are conducted, then they are less likely to object and 
more likely to comply with pat-down requests.150 
Similarly, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme Court upheld 
Alabama’s creation of gender-specific positions in its prison sys-
tem because maintaining prison security is the essence of a cor-
rection officer’s job and prisoners—a different type of cus-
tomer—were entitled to feel safe.151 Outside the privacy and 
safety contexts, there may also be room within the law for em-
ployers to discriminate based on customers’ preference for genu-
ineness, such as a woman playing Cinderella in a play.152 
Customer preference cases provide a useful model for how 
courts should analyze customer feedback discrimination claims 
involving feedback the customer intended, and the employer 
 
 149. Wade v. Napolitano, No. 3-07-0892, 2009 WL 9071049, at *1–2 (M.D. 
Tenn. Mar. 24, 2009). 
 150. Id. at *9. 
 151. 433 U.S. 321, 332–37 (1977). 
 152. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2 (2016) (recognizing sex as a BFOQ where au-
thenticity or genuineness is at issue). The courts tend to agree that in limited 
circumstances an employer is permitted to discriminate where gender-based au-
thenticity is at issue. See, e.g., St. Cross v. Playboy Club, Inc., Appeal No. 773, 
Case No. CSF 22618-70 (N.Y. Human Rights App. Bd. 1971) (finding being fe-
male a BFOQ for the position of a Playboy Bunny because female sexuality is 
reasonably necessary to perform the dominant purpose of the job, which is to 
titillate and entice male customers). They likewise have acknowledged the pos-
sibility of race- and national-origin-based authenticity discrimination. See, e.g., 
Miller v. Tex. State Bd. of Barber Exam’rs, 615 F.2d 650, 653–54 (5th Cir. 1980) 
(questioning whether race might in fact constitute a BFOQ in certain situations, 
such as a black actor portraying George Wallace or a white actor portraying 
Martin Luther King Jr.); Util. Workers v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262, 
1265 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (suggesting, without holding, that the authenticity excep-
tion would give rise to a BFOQ for Chinese nationality where necessary to main-
tain the authentic atmosphere of an ethnic Chinese restaurant); see also Mi-
chael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertainment 
Industries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. REV. 473, 
525 (2001) (“Although courts are willing to recognize an authenticity justifica-
tion for BFOQs, the fact that Congress intentionally elected not to enact a BFOQ 
for race or color prevents courts from judicially creating one even to protect the 
authenticity of theatrical productions.”). But see EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 
136 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1312–13 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (rejecting argument that hiring 
only male servers was necessary to create an “Old World” ambience modeled 
after the highest-quality restaurants in Europe). 
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knew, to be biased. In general, an employer would be prohibited 
from using tainted feedback for the same reason the courts pro-
hibit employers from acquiescing to customers’ discriminatory 
demands: it runs counter to Title VII’s goal of eradicating dis-
crimination from the workplace.153 As with customer preference 
cases, there may be some room to allow employers to discrimi-
nate where biased customer feedback is tied to privacy, safety, 
or authenticity concerns. For instance, a playhouse might be en-
titled to recast the role of Ray Charles as a black man if patrons 
left comment cards expressing outrage that a white man was 
given the part, or a women’s gym could hire only female trainers 
if members complained that having male trainers violated their 
privacy. 
2. Intentional but Unknown Bias 
It is more difficult to predict how a court would address a 
situation in which customers intend for their feedback to be bi-
ased, but the bias is unknown to the employer who then uses it 
to make employment decisions. The customer preference cases 
are unhelpful in answering this question because, at least so far, 
they involve only blatantly prejudicial customer requests that 
the employers knew were discriminatory. If an employer is una-
ware that feedback is biased, does this foreclose the possibility 
of the discrimination being intentional? Or might a court impose 
some sort of duty on the employer to make itself aware (and 
therefore conscious) that the feedback was biased? If so, how far 
would that duty extend? Suppose Dr. Flowers’s patient feedback 
included both quantitative and qualitative components. The 
quantitative component consisted strictly of numerical scores, 
but the qualitative component included sexist comments about 
Dr. Flowers from several patients. If the clinic only looked at the 
quantitative data, which showed no obvious signs of bias, but 
forgot to review the qualitative data (which surely would have 
tipped the clinic off that several respondents were sexist), would 
the clinic’s discrimination still be unintentional? What if the 
clinic purposely chose not to examine the patients’ comments be-
cause it was afraid of what it might find? Because unconscious 
 
 153. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 254–55 (1994) (“Title 
VII’s ‘central statutory purposes [are] eradicating discrimination throughout 
the economy and making persons whole for injuries suffered through past dis-
crimination’ . . . .” (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 
(1975))). 
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discrimination claims are almost always brought under a dispar-
ate impact theory,154 the case law offers virtually no guidance as 
to whether an employer has a duty to make itself conscious of 
discriminatory customer feedback in the disparate treatment 
context. The negligence framework I propose in Part IV seeks to 
remedy this deficiency. 
Setting aside the question of whether an employer has a 
duty to make itself conscious of discriminatory feedback, there 
may be an alternative ground for a court to determine whether 
the employer intentionally discriminated despite its lack of 
knowledge that the feedback was biased. Under the cat’s paw 
theory of liability, “an employer may be liable for employment 
discrimination if the source of illegal animus was not the final 
employment decision-maker but rather another employee whose 
animus proximately caused the adverse employment action.”155 
Although not perfectly analogous, cat’s paw discrimination is 
factually similar to a situation in which an employer uninten-
tionally discriminates based on intentionally biased customer 
feedback. Both scenarios involve unsuspecting ultimate deci-
sion-makers who bear no animus themselves, yet nonetheless 
permit others’ intentionally discriminatory feedback to affect the 
employment decision. 
The Supreme Court’s analysis of cat’s paw discrimination in 
Staub v. Proctor Hospital is helpful in thinking about how courts 
might approach a claim involving customer feedback in which 
the bias is intentional but unknown to the employer.156 Vincent 
Staub claimed his termination was motivated by his employer’s 
 
 154. See, e.g., Gordon v. City of New York, No. 14 Civ. 6115, 2016 WL 
4618969, at *1–7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2016) (explaining that certain facially neu-
tral employment practices “can cause a disparate impact through favoritism or 
unconscious racism or any number of other behaviors that are not intentionally 
discriminatory”); Sperling v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1346, 1362 
(D.N.J. 1996) (holding that the plaintiffs’ claim that subjective decision-making 
procedures resulted “in both conscious and unconscious discrimination is a dis-
parate impact claim and not a pattern-or-practice claim”). 
 155. Mason v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 134 F. Supp. 3d 868, 874 (E.D. Pa. 
2015); see also McKenna v. City of Phila., 649 F.3d 171, 178 (3d Cir. 2011). Judge 
Posner was the first to refer to subordinate bias liability as the cat’s paw doc-
trine. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 405 (7th Cir. 1990). The term 
derives from Jean LaFontaine’s fable, The Monkey and the Cat, “in which a 
monkey convinces a gullible cat to pull chestnuts from a hot fire. The cat 
snatches them from the fire, each time burning its paw, only to find that the 
monkey has eaten all of the chestnuts.” Sara Atherton Mason, Cat’s Paw Cases: 
The Standard for Assessing Subordinate Bias Liability, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. 435, 436 (2011). 
 156. 562 U.S. 411 (2011). 
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hostility to his obligations as a member of the U.S. Army Re-
serve, which required him to devote a certain number of days 
each year to training.157 He alleged that although the vice pres-
ident of human resources, who lacked such hostility, made the 
decision to terminate him, her decision was influenced by his su-
pervisors, who were perturbed by his military obligations.158 The 
Court began by noting that disparate treatment is an intentional 
tort, which “generally require[s] that the actor intend ‘the conse-
quences[] of an act,’ not simply ‘the act itself.’”159 It then ques-
tioned whether the discriminatory motive of a subordinate em-
ployee can be aggregated with the act of a decision-maker, 
ultimately concluding that because the law requires only that 
the protected trait be a motivating factor in the employment de-
cision, “[s]o long as the agent intends, for discriminatory reasons, 
that the adverse action occur, he has the scienter required to be 
liable under [antidiscrimination laws].”160 The Court further 
reasoned that “it is axiomatic under tort law that the exercise of 
judgment by the decision-maker does not prevent the earlier 
agent’s action (and hence the earlier agent’s discriminatory ani-
mus) from being the proximate cause of the harm.”161 Nor could 
the decision-maker’s judgment be deemed a superseding cause 
of the harm, the Court noted, because a cause is superseding 
“only if it is a ‘cause of independent origin that was not foresee-
able.’”162 
In rejecting the employer’s position that an employer can 
only be liable if the de facto decision-maker possesses discrimi-
natory animus, the Court explained: 
[T]he approach urged upon us by Proctor gives an unlikely meaning to 
a provision designed to prevent employer discrimination. An em-
ployer ’s authority to reward, punish, or dismiss is often allocated 
among multiple agents. The one who makes the ultimate decision does 
so on the basis of performance assessments by other supervisors. Proc-
tor ’s view would have the improbable consequence that if an employer 
isolates a personnel official from an employee’s supervisors, vests the 
decision to take adverse employment actions in that official, and asks 
that official to review the employee’s personnel file before taking the 
adverse action, then the employer will be effectively shielded from dis-
 
 157. Id. at 413–14. 
 158. Id. at 415. 
 159. Id. at 417 (quoting Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1998)). 
 160. Id. at 417–19. 
 161. Id. at 419. 
 162. Id. at 420 (quoting Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S. 830, 837 
(1996)). 
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criminatory acts and recommendations of supervisors that were de-
signed and intended to produce the adverse action. That seems to us 
an implausible meaning of the text, and one that is not compelled by 
its words.163 
Two important principles emerge from Staub. First, because 
disparate treatment is a kind of intentional tort (or at least 
equivalent thereto), an unsuspecting employer can only be liable 
if the subordinate actor intends, for discriminatory reasons, to 
cause the adverse action. Thus, even if customer bias is not ob-
vious to the employer, it could still be liable if the customer gives 
feedback intended to get an employee demoted or fired for dis-
criminatory reasons. One problem with this, of course, is that it 
would be exceedingly difficult for a plaintiff to prove a customer’s 
discriminatory motive, particularly if the feedback was solely 
quantitative or given anonymously. But the more pressing con-
cern is that some, if not most, discriminatory feedback results 
from implicit bias; as such, a plaintiff would be hard pressed to 
argue that an implicitly biased customer gave feedback that was 
“designed and intended” for discriminatory reasons to produce 
the adverse action. It seems, then, that the cat’s paw principle 
might be of some use in expanding liability to scenarios in which 
employers are unaware of the bias, yet a plaintiff is able to prove 
the customer consciously gave prejudicial feedback with the in-
tent of causing an adverse action. 
The other relevant principle from Staub is that cat’s paw li-
ability is premised on an agency relationship between the em-
ployer and the subordinate actor. The reason cat’s paw liability 
works is because the subordinate actor whose animus motivates 
the employment decision is an employee, and thus an agent, of 
the employer. For some commentators, the requirement of an 
agency relationship renders the cat’s paw theory untenable in 
cases where the discriminator is a nonemployee.164 But this po-
sition overlooks the reality that when an employer factors cus-
tomer feedback into an employment decision, it has made the 
customer a pseudoagent. Einat Albin persuasively argues the 
law should rethink discrimination liability in light of the fact 
that, as employers become more reliant on feedback from cus-
tomers, they grant those customers more sway over employing 
functions that were once reserved exclusively to management, 
 
 163. Id. at 420. 
 164. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 4, at 259 (“But Staub’s seeming expansion 
of the employer ’s liability beyond the discrimination of the ultimate decision 
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such as hiring, firing, and compensation.165 Lu-in Wang simi-
larly reasons that “[t]his participation makes the customer sim-
ultaneously and paradoxically both a ‘partial employee’ of the 
firm and . . . a second ‘boss’ to the worker.”166 When an employer 
relies on a customer’s feedback to make an employment decision, 
the employer has effectively outsourced some of its decision-
making authority to the customer. The customer becomes an 
agent of the employer in the sense that the employer has empow-
ered the customer to influence, if not altogether make, employ-
ment decisions. But even if courts are reticent to deem the em-
ployer-customer relationship one of agency, perhaps the cat’s 
paw doctrine could be extended by arguing there is no apprecia-
ble difference between a decision-maker relying on a subordinate 
employee’s tainted disciplinary action, as was the case in Staub, 
and reliance on a customer’s tainted feedback, since both the 
subordinate employee’s disciplinary action and the customer’s 
feedback were intended, for discriminatory reasons, to cause the 
adverse action. 
3. Unintentional and Unknown Bias 
Under current interpretations of disparate treatment law, a 
victim of customer feedback discrimination would be least likely 
to prevail in situations where the customers did not intend to 
discriminate and the employer did not know their feedback was 
biased. The case law offers precious little guidance on this cate-
gory of claims, which is unfortunate because unintentional and 
unknown bias is a very common type of customer feedback dis-
crimination. Evidentiary challenges aside, the biggest problem 
with feedback in which bias is unintentional and unknown is the 
complete absence of intentionality by either the customer or the 
employer. If neither the customer nor the employer knows the 
feedback is biased, then under the Price Waterhouse test the em-
ployer truthfully would deny that at the moment of the decision 
the protected trait motivated the employment decision.167 
Still, the fact that customer bias may be unintentional and 
unknown does not make it any less true that the employee was 
discriminated against based on a protected trait. In reality, 
whether Dr. Flowers’s patients realized they rated her lower be-
cause of their implicit biases, and whether the clinic knew the 
ratings were biased, are irrelevant in the sense that neither fact 
 
 165. See Albin, supra note 45, at 186–90. 
 166. Wang, supra note 4, at 264–65 (internal citations omitted). 
 167. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989). 
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has any bearing on whether Dr. Flowers was terminated because 
of her sex (or, alternatively, that her sex motivated the employ-
ment decision). Although the growing consensus among the 
courts seems to be that a claim of unknowing discrimination 
such as this must be brought under the disparate impact frame-
work,168 there may yet be room within the disparate treatment 
framework to plausibly argue that the clinic intentionally dis-
criminated even though the bias was unintentional on the pa-
tients’ part and unknown to the clinic. 
In Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., the First Circuit provided 
a roadmap for how a plaintiff may prove an employer intention-
ally discriminated even when the intermediary actor, as well as 
the employer itself, were unaware of the discrimination.169 Myr-
tle Thomas claimed she was terminated based on a series of ra-
cially biased performance appraisals from her supervisor.170 
Thomas lost her job under circumstances similar to Dr. Flowers: 
Kodak decided to reduce its workforce by terminating employees 
with the lowest performance review scores over the past three 
years.171 The district court granted Kodak summary judgment, 
in part because Thomas failed to link her low scores to her 
race.172 Significantly, in reversing the lower court, the First Cir-
cuit noted that “Title VII’s prohibition against ‘disparate treat-
ment because of race’ extends to both employer acts based on 
conscious racial animus and to employer decisions that are based 
on stereotyped thinking or other forms of less conscious bias.”173 
The court pointed out that Thomas’s claim was different “than 
the type often used to exemplify the operation of the McDonnell 
Douglas . . . framework” insofar as it alleged “a more subtle type 
of disparate treatment” by challenging the neutrality of the per-
formance review system—an argument that is typically reserved 
for disparate impact cases—as opposed to claiming her employer 
had articulated a false reason for her layoff.174 The court rejected 
the notion that Thomas had to prove the ratings were con-
sciously biased, reasoning that “[t]he ultimate question is 
whether the employee has been treated disparately ‘because of 
race.’ This is so regardless of whether the employer consciously 
 
 168. See cases cited supra note 133. 
 169. 183 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999). 
 170. Id. at 42. 
 171. Id. at 46. 
 172. Id. at 57. 
 173. Id. at 42 (emphasis added). 
 174. Id. at 58. 
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intended to base the evaluations on race, or simply did so be-
cause of unthinking stereotypes or bias.”175 The court supported 
this proposition by citing a portion of the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning 
in Price Waterhouse—which the Supreme Court left undis-
turbed—wherein the appellate court declared: 
unwitting or ingrained bias is no less injurious or worthy of eradication 
than blatant or calculated discrimination . . . . [T]he fact that some or 
all of the partners at Price Waterhouse may have been unaware of that 
motivation, even within themselves, neither alters the fact of its exist-
ence nor excuses it.176 
In the First Circuit’s view, Thomas’s inability to prove her su-
pervisor’s ratings were consciously biased did not preclude the 
possibility of disparate treatment. Instead, less conscious—but 
equally pernicious—bias could be inferred from other facts, in-
cluding that Thomas’s scores sharply declined after she was 
given a new supervisor and that the new supervisor had rated 
Thomas lower than the white employees whom she evaluated.177 
It did not matter to the Thomas court whether either the 
employer or the author of the performance reviews was con-
sciously aware that the data was biased. Thomas survived sum-
mary judgment by presenting enough evidence to create a fact 
issue as to whether the ratings were in fact biased. In Dr. Flow-
ers’s case, if the court accepted the proposition that a plaintiff 
can establish disparate treatment without showing the employer 
consciously discriminated, she could at least theoretically pre-
vail by proving the ratings themselves were discriminatory, re-
gardless of whether the patients intended to discriminate or 
whether the clinic knew the feedback was biased. The problem, 
of course, is that proving the ratings were actually biased would 
be extremely difficult, if not altogether impossible. Unlike 
Thomas, who created an inference of implicit bias based on evi-
dence that she had received higher ratings from a previous su-
pervisor and that her current supervisor rated her lower than 
the white employees whom she supervised, Dr. Flowers would 
have to rely on far less concrete evidence. Patients who gave Dr. 
Flowers low ratings could not testify that their implicit biases 
influenced their ratings; by definition, an implicit bias is un-
known to the actor.178 Nor would a comparison of Dr. Flowers’s 
 
 175. Id. (emphasis added). 
 176. Id. at 60 (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 469 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987)). 
 177. Id. at 62–63. 
 178. Cerullo, supra note 131, at 139. 
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ratings to other doctors’ scores be fruitful, since different pa-
tients rated each doctor. Perhaps Dr. Flowers’s best option would 
be to have a social scientist run sophisticated statistical models 
to attempt to detect implicit bias. However, because such an 
analysis would be extremely sensitive to confounding variables, 
the clinic’s patient-satisfaction questionnaire would have to be 
sufficiently refined to allow a statistician to isolate implicit 
bias—a longshot by almost any measure. 
In sum, there is tremendous uncertainty surrounding the 
use of a disparate treatment framework to prove customer feed-
back discrimination. The framework likely would work in cases 
where bias is explicit and known to the employer, similar to cus-
tomer preference cases. But in cases where the bias is unknown 
to the employer, the framework would be much less likely to sup-
port a customer feedback discrimination claim unless a court 
were willing to extend cat’s paw principles to cases of intentional 
but unknown bias, or, in cases of unintentional and unknown 
bias, a plaintiff could somehow prove the ratings were actually 
biased. These possibilities notwithstanding, victims of customer 
feedback discrimination face tremendously long odds in prevail-
ing under the disparate treatment framework. 
B. DISPARATE IMPACT 
Nearly all cases of unintentional discrimination are ana-
lyzed under the disparate impact framework.179 Although the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 did not expressly prohibit employment 
policies or practices that produce a disparate impact, the Su-
preme Court recognized such a prohibition in the landmark case 
of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., wherein it interpreted the Act to 
prohibit certain facially neutral employment practices that, in 
fact, were “discriminatory in operation.”180 Two decades later, 
Congress codified the disparate impact doctrine as part of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1991.181 Under the statute, a plaintiff estab-
lishes a prima facie violation by showing an employer uses “a 
particular employment practice that causes a disparate impact 
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”182 An 
 
 179. See cases cited supra note 133. 
 180. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Griggs “has been universally hailed as the 
most important development in employment discrimination law.” Michael 
Selmi, Was Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 703 
(2006) [hereinafter Selmi, Disparate Impact]. 
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employer may defend against liability by demonstrating the 
practice is “job related for the position in question and consistent 
with business necessity.”183 If the employer meets this burden, a 
plaintiff may still succeed by showing the employer refuses to 
adopt an available alternative employment practice that has less 
disparate impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs.184 
At least in theory, claims of unintentional discrimination are 
well suited for the disparate impact framework because a court’s 
sole focus is on the effect of an employment practice—not the 
employer’s intent.185 
Although there were no published decisions by the end of 
2017 involving allegations that customer feedback resulted in 
disparate impact, plaintiffs have used this framework in claim-
ing other types of subjective evaluations (typically supervisor-
generated performance reviews) disproportionately impacted a 
protected group. For instance, Microsoft is currently embroiled 
in a massive class action discrimination lawsuit in which the 
plaintiffs claim Microsoft’s procedure for evaluating perfor-
mance “systematically undervalues female technical employees 
relative to their male peers.”186 Pittsburgh Glass Works likewise 
has been involved in litigation for more than seven years over 
claims its subjective evaluation process led to a disproportionate 
number of older workers being laid off.187 In challenging these 
policies, the plaintiffs need only prove the discriminatory effect 
of such policies rather than a discriminatory motive.188 
At first blush, disparate impact may seem like the ideal 
framework in which to prove customer feedback discrimination, 
particularly in cases where discriminatory animus on the em-
ployer’s part is lacking. However, a closer examination of the 
theory reveals multiple drawbacks that render this framework 
much less enticing, if not altogether infeasible. For instance, un-
 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii). 
 185. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2015) (“In 
evaluating a disparate-impact claim, courts focus on the effects of an employ-
ment practice, determining whether they are unlawful irrespective of motiva-
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 186. Class Action Complaint at ¶ 24, Moussouris v. Microsoft Corp., No. 
2:15-cv-01483 (W.D. Wash. filed Sept. 16, 2015), 2015 WL 5460411. 
 187. See Karlo v. Pittsburgh Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 
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 188. See Hill v. Miss. State Emp’t Serv., 918 F.2d 1233, 1238 (5th Cir. 1990) 
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like with disparate treatment claims, Title VII forbids compen-
satory and punitive damages for disparate impact claims,189 au-
tomatically making such claims less attractive for many plain-
tiffs and their attorneys.190 Although the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA) does not differentiate between the 
types of damages available to victims of disparate treatment and 
disparate impact age discrimination, liquidated damages are 
available only upon proof of willfulness, which of course tends to 
be extremely difficult to prove in disparate impact cases.191 
Not only are damages in disparate impact cases more lim-
ited, but the cases themselves are harder to win.192 Michael 
Selmi’s analysis of three decades worth of disparate impact cases 
revealed that plaintiffs prevailed at the appellate level in only 
19.2% of cases (the majority of which were remands rather than 
outright victories) and at the district court level in 25.1% of cases 
(many of which involved simply surviving summary judg-
ment).193 By contrast, the win rate for plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination cases more generally stands around 35%.194 
Selmi attributes the lack of success by disparate impact plain-
tiffs not to any inherent difficulty in establishing that a practice 
or policy disparately impacts a particular group, but rather in 
courts’ hesitance to seriously question an employer’s defense 
 
 189. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1); see also Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass’n, 
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that the practice or policy is job-related and consistent with busi-
ness necessity.195 He explains that “courts routinely defer to em-
ployer practices in making those judgments . . . because courts 
typically are reluctant to identify ambiguous behavior as dis-
criminatory.”196 
Selmi’s analysis exposes another troubling truth about dis-
parate impact claims. The disparate impact framework initially 
was constructed to combat discrimination in seniority systems 
and written tests, and “[a]lthough courts have never restricted 
the theory to those particular contexts, the reality has been that 
the theory has proved an ill fit for any challenge other than to 
written examinations.”197 Selmi found this to be especially true 
of cases involving subjective employment practices, which cer-
tainly would include customer feedback-based employment deci-
sions, noting that “these claims have been almost uniformly un-
successful” and that “the reality is that subjective employment 
practices are almost always more successful as intentional dis-
crimination claims.”198 Selmi suggests this is because a court 
that would not see intentional discrimination amidst circum-
stantial evidence “would have an equally hard time identifying 
discrimination based on adverse effects that were, by definition, 
unintentional. Even if statistical disparate impact could be 
shown, the court would likely accept the employer’s practices as 
justified, just as it found the employer’s practice nondiscrimina-
tory.”199 Based on Selmi’s analysis, not only would a customer-
feedback-based disparate impact claim be harder to prove than 
other disparate impact claims, but it would also be more difficult 
to prove than if the claim were brought under the disparate 
treatment framework. 
Selmi’s point about judicial deference to employers has the 
potential to be especially true of customer feedback discrimina-
tion. One can easily envision a scenario in which an employer 
defends itself from a disparate impact customer feedback dis-
crimination claim by arguing that reliance on customer feedback 
to make employment decisions constitutes a business necessity, 
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lish than intentional discrimination claims rests entirely on the first part of the 
theory regarding the prima facie case of discrimination, but ignores the business 
necessity prong, which has always proved the greater hurdle.”). 
 196. Id. at 769. 
 197. Id. at 705. 
 198. Id. at 744. 
 199. Id. at 769. 
 2210 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2169 
 
insofar as customer satisfaction is crucial to an employer’s live-
lihood and is socially beneficial. A similar argument prevailed in 
EEOC v. Sephora USA, LLC, where the EEOC alleged Sephora’s 
rule requiring employees to speak English whenever clients 
were present adversely impacted Hispanic employees.200 
Sephora responded, and the district court agreed, that the policy 
constituted a business necessity as a matter of law because the 
policy was not merely intended to satisfy customer preference 
but was in fact indispensable to promoting politeness to custom-
ers.201 In the customer feedback realm, an employer could simi-
larly argue that its ability to consider customer feedback in mak-
ing employment decisions is equally necessary to ensure 
customer satisfaction. 
A final problem with the disparate impact framework is that 
establishing a statistically significant adverse impact almost al-
ways requires that a sufficiently large and diverse population be 
affected by the challenged practice.202 Indeed, courts have rou-
tinely held that an adverse effect on a single or a few employees 
does not create a prima facie case of disparate impact as a matter 
of law.203 This not only precludes a plaintiff from asserting a dis-
parate impact claim unless she is one of several employees af-
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ple, that “exceedingly small sample sizes often result in statistically unreliable 
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fected by the employer’s policy or practice, but also virtually en-
sures no employee who works for a smaller business—one-half 
of today’s workforce204—could realistically bring a disparate im-
pact claim because of the difficulty of proving statistical signifi-
cance. For instance, if Dr. Flowers asserts a disparate impact 
claim against the clinic, she stands almost no chance of surviving 
summary judgment because she was the only employee termi-
nated under the facially neutral employment practice. Moreover, 
even if Dr. Flowers had been one of several female doctors to lose 
her job, proving statistical significance would be almost impossi-
ble unless the clinic employed hundreds of doctors, such that Dr. 
Flowers could prove the clinic’s practice adversely impacted an 
entire class. 
In sum, although disparate impact may seem like a more 
promising framework than disparate treatment for asserting 
customer feedback discrimination claims, the theory is fraught 
with limitations that diminish its attractiveness and utility. 
Given the statutory restrictions on damages, the tendency of 
courts to side with employers on the business necessity defense, 
and the requirement of class-wide rather than individual dis-
crimination, it is no wonder disparate impact claims rarely have 
been asserted in employment discrimination cases.205 For most 
victims of customer feedback discrimination, these limitations 
would likely render disparate impact not only unappealing but 
outright untenable. 
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IV.  A NEW APPROACH   
To adequately protect employees from customer feedback 
discrimination, a new approach is needed that gives victims re-
alistic options for pursuing their claims beyond the traditional 
disparate treatment/disparate impact binary. The current sys-
tem is unacceptable because it effectively shuts out victims of 
customer feedback discrimination from the legal system in most 
scenarios. If Dr. Flowers asserts a disparate treatment claim, 
she probably would win if she can prove the clinic knew the feed-
back was sexist. That is the good news. But under any other sce-
nario her chances of success drop precipitously because of the 
difficulty of proving the clinic’s discrimination was intentional. 
Asserting a disparate impact claim would relieve Dr. Flowers 
from proving intentional discrimination—her biggest barrier to 
prevailing under the disparate treatment framework—yet it, 
too, comes with its own set of problems that make it unlikely she 
would prevail on such a claim. 
That Dr. Flowers has almost no realistic path to recovery is 
an indictment of the current state of employment discrimination 
law. Title VII seeks to eradicate workplace discrimination by im-
posing on employers a duty to protect their employees from dis-
crimination.206 This is true whether the discrimination is inten-
tional or unintentional, conscious or unconscious.207 Dr. 
Flowers’s inability to prove discrimination unless there is evi-
dence the clinic knew the feedback was tainted conveys the mes-
sage to employers and employees alike that subtle or inadvertent 
discrimination is not as serious as more intentional discrimina-
tion. While on some level an employer may be less culpable for 
unknowingly using customer feedback that does not appear on 
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its face to be biased, this does not change the fact that “the vic-
tims of unconscious discrimination have suffered the same eco-
nomic damages, and often the same emotional damages, as the 
victims of knowing bigotry.”208 In fact, many scholars argue sub-
tle discrimination is just as harmful as intentional discrimina-
tion, if not more so.209 
The current legal framework is also untenable because it 
does little to incentivize employers to carefully scrutinize cus-
tomer feedback for bias. As the Supreme Court has noted, Con-
gress enacted Title VII to motivate employers “to self-examine 
and to self-evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor 
to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortu-
nate and ignominious page in this country’s history.”210 As pre-
viously discussed, the threat of disparate impact liability is min-
imal, and employers have even less incentive to self-examine and 
self-evaluate in the disparate treatment context, since the law 
does not appear to impose on employers any duty to make them-
selves aware of biases in customer feedback. If unawareness con-
stitutes an absolute defense to intentional discrimination, what 
motivation would an employer have to review customer feedback 
for signs of bias, much less engage expensive statisticians to sift 
through the data in search of implicit bias? 
 
 208. Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 916. 
 209. See, e.g., Peter A. Clark, Prejudice and the Medical Profession: A Five-
Year Update, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 118, 118 (2009) (“It is clear that a subtle, 
perhaps unconscious form of racism is just as harmful as expressed hatred and 
bigotry . . . .”); Casey A. Kovacic, The Real BCS: Black Coach Syndrome and the 
Pursuit to Become a College Head Football Coach, 36 S.U. L. REV. 89, 104 (2008) 
(“Unconscious racism is not less harmful than intentional discrimination. In 
fact, it may likely be more harmful because it is frequently unrecognizable by 
the victim as well as the perpetrator.”); Samuel Noh et al., Overt and Subtle 
Racial Discrimination and Mental Health: Preliminary Findings for Korean Im-
migrants, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1269, 1269–72 (2007) (finding that subtle rac-
ism can be more psychologically damaging than overt racism because recipients 
can more easily shrug off overt discrimination, whereas subtle racism is more 
likely to be committed by colleagues, neighbors, or friends, which causes recipi-
ents to feel that people do not like or accept them, thereby lowering self-esteem 
and leading to depression); Derald Wing Sue et al., Racial Microaggressions in 
Everyday Life: Implications for Clinical Practice, 62 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 271, 
272–84 (2007) (concluding that invisibility and deniability of racial mi-
croaggressions make them especially problematic for recipients, who must try 
to decide whether the discrimination was deliberate or unintentional); Eli Wald, 
In-House Myths, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 407, 461 (2012) (“Unintended and uninten-
tional as implicit discrimination may be, it has real and harmful consequences 
that must be addressed by legal means.”). 
 210. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417–18 (1975). 
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Given the proliferation of customer feedback—and of both 
explicit and implicit bias within that feedback—we cannot afford 
to let customer feedback discrimination claims slip through the 
cracks simply because they do not fit neatly under either a dis-
parate treatment or disparate impact model of discrimination.211 
This is not a conundrum incapable of being solved. In truth, the 
solution is quite simple: employers should be held to a negligence 
standard in customer feedback discrimination cases, whereby 
they would be liable if they knew, or had reason to know, the 
feedback was biased and failed to act reasonably in response. As 
I explain below, this standard would remedy many of the short-
comings of the extant frameworks in a manner that could appeal 
to employers and employees alike. In Section A, I make the ar-
gument that applying a negligence standard to customer dis-
crimination cases is hardly a radical proposition because negli-
gence principles abound in other areas of employment 
discrimination law. In Section B, I examine how a negligence 
standard would be preferable to the disparate treatment/dispar-
ate impact dichotomy in determining which employers are truly 
bad actors who warrant liability. In Section C, I consider how a 
negligence standard could incentivize employers to be more 
mindful and proactive in protecting employees from customer 
feedback discrimination. 
A. A FOUNDATION OF NEGLIGENCE 
At first blush, applying a negligence standard to customer 
feedback discrimination claims may seem a drastic departure 
from Title VII jurisprudence. After all, the Supreme Court has 
consistently interpreted “Title VII as providing tort-like actions 
under theories of intentional tort [in disparate treatment cases] 
and strict liability [in disparate impact cases].”212 In her concur-
ring opinion in Price Waterhouse, Justice O’Connor first referred 
 
 211. See Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense of Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 
24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 119, 126 (2012) (“Remedies, proof patterns and avail-
able defenses all turn on whether liability is based on disparate treatment or 
disparate impact, yet many troublesome situations cannot comfortably be ana-
lyzed in the treatment/impact framework.”); Zatz, supra note 3, at 1366 (criti-
cizing the disparate treatment-disparate impact dichotomy as a “theoretical 
straitjacket with two arms”). 
 212. Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 918–19; see also Sandra F. Sperino, 
Let’s Pretend Discrimination Is a Tort, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1107, 1109–14 (2014) 
[hereinafter Sperino, Let’s Pretend] (tracing how the Supreme Court has in-
creasingly embraced tort law as a substantive framework for discrimination 
law); Sandra F. Sperino, The Tort Label, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2014) 
(“[T]he Supreme Court repeatedly applies negligence concepts to discrimination 
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to Title VII as a “statutory employment ‘tort.’”213 Thereafter, in 
Staub v. Proctor Hospital, a disparate treatment case, the Court 
observed that “[i]ntentional torts such as this, ‘as distinguished 
from negligent or reckless torts[,] . . . generally require that the 
actor intend “the consequences[] of an act,” not simply “the act 
itself.”’”214 Yet for all the emphasis courts place on intentional-
ity, there are several areas of discrimination law where negli-
gence principles figure prominently into employer liability,215 in-
cluding the areas of harassment, accommodation, and disparate 
impact. 
The negligence standard is most readily apparent in how 
courts assess employer liability for coworker harassment. In-
deed, the Supreme Court has made clear in cases where “the har-
assing employee is the victim’s co-worker, the employer is liable 
only if it was negligent in controlling working conditions.”216 Un-
der this standard, harassment decisions do not focus on intent to 
do wrong but rather on the employer’s failure to do right.217 Da-
vid Oppenheimer explains that “[t]he employer is liable not be-
cause it wanted the harm to occur, or helped bring about its oc-
currence, but because the law imposed on it a duty of care to 
protect its employees from co-employee harassment, and it failed 
to take the necessary steps to protect them.”218 It is significant 
that courts analyze harassment claims under the disparate 
treatment framework,219 yet within that framework allow a 
 
claims, even though it also claims that disparate treatment claims require proof 
of intent.”). 
 213. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 264 (1989) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment). 
 214. 562 U.S. 411, 417 (2011) (quoting Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 
61–62 (1998)). 
 215. See Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 899 (“[T]he existing law of employ-
ment discrimination, while eschewing the term negligence, frequently incorpo-
rates the doctrine.”); Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 69, 99 (2011) (“[I]deas of negligence abound within the accepted 
discrimination frameworks.”); Weiss, supra note 211, at 124 (“Although negli-
gence theories are not well-recognized under Title VII, they have some basis in 
existing law.”). 
 216. Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). 
 217. Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 950. 
 218. Id. at 966. 
 219. See Reeves v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 594 F.3d 798, 808 n.4 
(11th Cir. 2010) (analyzing hostile work environment claim under disparate 
treatment framework); Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 617 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(“Under Title VII, a hostile work environment is one form of disparate treat-
ment . . . .”); Roberts v. Archbold Med. Ctr., 220 F. Supp. 3d 1333, 1334 (M.D. 
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plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination by showing mere 
negligence on the employer’s part. 
Though less explicit, negligence principles are also present 
in accommodation law. In certain instances, it is not enough that 
an employer simply refrains from discriminating against an em-
ployee; the employer has an affirmative duty to provide a rea-
sonable accommodation to the employee. This is true where an 
employee’s religion,220 disability,221 or, in some instances, preg-
nancy222 conflicts with job requirements. Oppenheimer explains 
that “an employer may be subjected to liability not because of 
any affirmative or intentionally discriminatory steps it has 
taken” but because it failed “to act affirmatively to protect em-
ployees or applicants from harm when it had a duty to do so. 
Liability cannot be explained under a theory of intentional 
wrong, nor of strict liability. The analogous common law tort is 
negligence.”223 
A final area of discrimination law where negligence princi-
ples are apparent is in the less-discriminatory-alternative test 
available in disparate impact cases. Under this test, a plaintiff 
may still succeed on a disparate impact claim even if the em-
ployer proves the challenged practice is job related and con-
sistent with business necessity “by showing that the employer 
refuses to adopt an available alternative practice that has less 
disparate impact and serves the employer’s legitimate needs.”224 
This test “encourages the consideration of a negligence theory of 
employment discrimination,” insofar as employer liability is 
premised on a breach of the employer’s duty to avoid disparate 
impact by “failing to adopt a less discriminatory alternative 
where such an alternative was available.”225 
The pervasiveness of negligence principles in Title VII juris-
prudence has prompted several commentators to call for the ex-
tension of the negligence standard to other areas of discrimina-
tion law. For example, Deborah Weiss argues employers should 
be held to a negligence standard for intentional discrimination 
 
Ga. 2016) (“[A] sexual harassment claim is not a unique type of disparate treat-
ment.”); Jackson v. Deen, 959 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1352 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (“[A] claim 
for a hostile work environment is a form of disparate treatment.”). 
 220. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2012). 
 221. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A)–(B). 
 222. See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1338, 1354 (2015). 
 223. Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 944. 
 224. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 557 (2009); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (C). 
 225. Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 932–34. 
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by supervisors in structural pattern-or-practice cases.226 Jessie 
Allen urges the application of negligence to cases of “unthinking” 
discrimination.227 Elizabeth Cramer claims courts should apply 
a negligence standard to coworker retaliation cases.228 And Op-
penheimer advocates for the application of negligence to employ-
ment discrimination claims more generally.229 
The relative ease with which negligence principles have 
been incorporated into discrimination law both in theory and in 
practice shows the feasibility of their application to customer 
feedback discrimination. But even though the application of a 
negligence standard does not appear to present any serious chal-
lenges doctrinally, its desirability hinges on whether the stand-
ard would have the power to produce actual results that are con-
sistent with Title VII’s goal of eradicating discrimination from 
the workplace. I argue in Sections B and C that in fact, this is 
precisely what a negligence standard would accomplish. 
B. ACTUAL OR CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE OF DISCRIMINATORY 
FEEDBACK 
Far and away, the most formidable barrier to proving cus-
tomer feedback discrimination under the disparate treatment 
framework is showing the employer intended to discriminate. 
While explicitly discriminatory feedback certainly is not un-
heard of,230 the reality is that customers often express their bi-
ases in discrete, subtle, and even unconscious ways that cannot 
easily be detected231—especially for employers lacking the so-
phisticated statistical training or elaborate feedback instru-
ments and methodologies required to spot such bias. But that 
should not excuse employers from at least making reasonable ef-
forts to identify tainted feedback, given the reality that a victim 
 
 226. Weiss, supra note 211, at 136–46. 
 227. See generally Jessie Allen, Note, A Possible Remedy for Unthinking Dis-
crimination, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1299 (1995). 
 228. Elizabeth A. Cramer, Taking Matters into Their Own Hands: Retalia-
tory Actions by Coworkers and the Fifth Circuit’s Narrow Standard for Employer 
Liability, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 591, 601–04 (2013). 
 229. Oppenheimer, supra note 82, at 969 (“From these well recognized in-
stances of negligence liability under Title VII, it is but a small step to a general 
application of the principle. Whenever an employer fails to act to prevent dis-
crimination which it knows, or should know, is occurring, which it expects to 
occur, or which it should expect to occur, it should be held negligent.”). 
 230. See supra Part II.B. 
 231. See supra Part II.B. 
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of customer feedback discrimination suffers as much harm re-
gardless of whether bias is explicit or implicit.232 At present, the 
law actually dissuades employers from making such efforts; if an 
employer does not know the feedback is biased, how can it be 
said that the employer intended to discriminate? Of course a 
plaintiff could always assert a disparate impact claim, but the 
dismal success rate of such claims outside the testing and sen-
iority contexts233 makes it unlikely an employer would take the 
threat of disparate impact liability seriously enough to alter its 
behavior. 
At the same time, strict liability seems neither a realistic 
nor appropriate answer. If an employer were liable any time a 
plaintiff could show that even one answer to a single survey was 
implicitly biased, thus causing a protected trait to motivate the 
employment decision, the employer may cease soliciting feed-
back from customers altogether. Although this would probably 
be welcome news to some weary consumers who are fed up with 
unending feedback requests, extinguishing customers’ voices 
and, consequently, their power seems too drastic of a measure. 
Customer satisfaction is an important driver of firms’ practices 
in the modern economy,234 and the law should not discourage it 
from remaining so to the extent it does not run afoul of antidis-
crimination measures. 
A negligence standard would strike an appropriate balance 
by imposing on employers a reasonable but not overly burden-
some duty to detect bias in customer feedback. Under this stand-
ard, an employer could no longer plead ignorance. If Dr. Flow-
ers’s feedback contained sexist comments from survey 
respondents, the clinic could not avoid liability simply because it 
declined to read such comments. Even though the clinic did not 
know the feedback was biased, it could have—and should have—
known so because evidence of the bias was readily apparent and 
could easily have been detected. Subjecting the clinic to a negli-
 
 232. See sources cited supra note 209. 
 233. See generally Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination 
Cases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555 (2001) (discussing the general diffi-
culty of winning employment discrimination and disparate impact claims along 
with possible reasons for those difficulties). 
 234. J.A.F. Nicholls et al., Parsimonious Measurement of Customer Satisfac-
tion with Personal Service and the Service Setting, 15 J. CONSUMER MARKET-
ING 239, 239 (1998) (“Customers are the lifeblood of any organization, be it pri-
vate sector business or public-sector government, because consumer satisfaction 
is the key to continued organizational survival.”). 
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gence standard should motivate the clinic to examine the feed-
back for signs of bias before relying on it. And yet the standard 
is not so onerous that the clinic would have to subject the feed-
back to round after round of expensive and time-consuming bias 
testing, which could potentially disincentivize an employer from 
seeking customer feedback altogether. In short, a negligence 
standard would advantage plaintiffs by allowing them to prove 
intent through constructive rather than actual knowledge, while 
at the same time only requiring employers to take reasonable 
measures to gain such knowledge. 
The biggest question left open by the imposition of a reason-
able-knowledge standard is what the standard would actually 
require from employers in customer feedback discrimination 
cases. The beauty—and the curse—of this standard is its highly 
fact-intensive nature. What constitutes reasonable knowledge 
would be decided case by case, based on factors such as the em-
ployer’s sophistication level, the characteristics of the workforce, 
and the type of feedback solicited. Still, as with any reasonable-
ness standard, over time the case law could help define the gen-
eral parameters of when an employer should have known feed-
back was biased. Employee harassment cases could be helpful in 
this regard since they, too, hold employers to a negligence stand-
ard.235 But perhaps even more instructive is the more factually 
analogous line of cases involving joint-employer staffing agen-
cies. Such cases typically involve a staffing agency that did not 
independently engage in discrimination but was nevertheless 
subject to liability for the discriminatory conduct of a joint-em-
ployer client if the agency knew or should have known of the cli-
ent’s discrimination but failed to take corrective measures 
within its control.236 For example, in Nicholson v. Securitas Se-
curity Services, USA, Inc., Helen Nicholson brought an age dis-
crimination action against Securitas, the staffing agency that 
employed her, after the agency removed her from a receptionist 
 
 235. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 768 (1988). 
 236. See Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 228–29 (5th 
Cir. 2015); Whitaker v. Milwaukee Cty., 772 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 2014); 
EEOC, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: APPLICATION OF EEO LAWS TO CONTINGENT 
WORKERS PLACED BY TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT AGENCIES AND OTHER STAFF-
ING FIRMS (1997), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/conting.html (“The firm is 
liable if it participates in the client’s discrimination. For example, if the firm 
honors its client’s request to remove a worker from a job assignment for a dis-
criminatory reason and replace him or her with an individual outside the 
worker ’s protected class, the firm is liable for the discriminatory discharge. The 
firm also is liable if it knew or should have known about the client’s discrimina-
tion and failed to undertake prompt corrective measures within its control.”). 
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position at the request of the agency’s client.237 The Fifth Circuit 
reversed summary judgment for the agency upon determining 
that a fact issue persisted as to whether the agency should have 
known the client’s reason for requesting Nicholson’s reassign-
ment was discriminatory because the agency deviated from its 
standard operating procedures by failing to investigate the cir-
cumstances of the client’s reassignment request and by not ask-
ing Nicholson for an explanation before removing her from the 
client site.238 Because the client’s reassignment request is a form 
of customer feedback, Nicholson could be helpful in the customer 
feedback discrimination context if, for instance, an employer or-
dinarily scanned feedback for certain discriminatory code words 
but failed to do so in a particular instance. 
Perhaps the most significant advantage of a reasonable-
knowledge standard is its flexibility in adapting to social and 
technological changes.239 Whether an employer reasonably 
should know customer feedback is biased has changed, and will 
continue to change, over time—both as definitions of discrimina-
tion evolve and as the methods for detecting discrimination be-
come more refined. When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 over five decades ago, our conceptualization of discrimi-
nation was markedly different than it is today.240 Discrimination 
was only actionable if it was based on race, color, sex, religion or 
national origin.241 Other characteristics, such as pregnancy,242 
 
 237. 830 F.3d 186, 187–88 (5th Cir. 2016). 
 238. Id. at 190–91. 
 239. See Sperino, Let’s Pretend, supra note 212, at 1125–26 (“If discrimina-
tion law is truly a tort, it should retain the flexibility to adapt to changed cir-
cumstances over time, including new understandings of how discrimination oc-
curs.”). 
 240. See Michael Selmi, The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law: 
Changed Doctrine for Changed Social Conditions, 2014 WIS. L. REV. 937, 942–
53 (tracing the history of how employment discrimination doctrine has changed 
in response to changing social conceptions); see also John Hasnas, Equal Oppor-
tunity, Affirmative Action, and the Anti-Discrimination Principle: The Philo-
sophical Basis for the Legal Prohibition of Discrimination, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 423, 474–81 (2002) (arguing that the Civil Rights Act was “clear[ly]” in-
tended as an antidifferentiation principle); Virginia W. Wei, Asian Women and 
Employment Discrimination: Using Intersectionality Theory to Address Title VII 
Claims Based on Combined Factors of Race, Gender and National Origin, 
37 B.C. L. REV. 771, 772 (1996) (“Over time, Title VII generally has been able to 
accommodate changing concepts of discrimination.”). 
 241. See EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 3213 (1968). 
 242. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012). 
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military status,243 disability,244 age,245 and genetics,246 did not 
receive protection until decades later. Even within the protected 
classes that did exist early on, discrimination was thought of 
very differently than it is today. For instance, it took several 
years for the Supreme Court to recognize the possibility of re-
verse race discrimination247 or same-sex harassment.248 Had a 
reasonable-knowledge standard applied since Title VII’s incep-
tion, the types of customer biases that an employer should have 
known about would have been different than what they would 
be today. Likewise, as antidiscrimination statutes extend their 
protections to other characteristics in the future—perhaps to 
sexual orientation,249 criminal background,250 and physical ap-
pearance251—the reasonable knowledge standard would expand 
to require employers to look for these types of biases as well. 
An employer’s duty to realize customer feedback is biased 
would also increase as scientific advances make it easier to un-
derstand and detect new forms of discrimination. When overt 
discrimination was more socially acceptable decades ago, a court 
applying a negligence standard may have found it perfectly rea-
sonable for an employer to scan customer feedback only for ex-
plicit signs of bias because that is how customers likely would 
have expressed their biases. Today, a court may rightfully find 
these same efforts unreasonable in light of our understanding 
that changing norms have resulted in less overt expressions of 
discrimination. In fact, given the prevalence of bias in customer 
feedback today, a plausible argument could be made that an em-
ployer should always have reason to know its feedback is likely 
 
 243. Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 
1994, 38 U.S.C. § 4301 (2012). 
 244. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101. 
 245. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2012). 
 246. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff. 
 247. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
 248. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998). 
 249. See Equality Act, H.R. 3185, 114th Cong. (2015) (proposing to amend 
Title VII to extend protection against sexual orientation and gender identity 
discrimination). 
 250. See generally Dallan F. Flake, When Any Sentence Is a Life Sentence: 
Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 45 
(2015) (arguing Title VII should be amended to include criminal background as 
a protected trait in some instances). 
 251. See, e.g., Sarah E. Friedricks, Note, Sexy Sex Discrimination: Why Ap-
pearance-Based Discrimination Is Sex Discrimination, 40 J. CORP. L. 503, 516–
19 (2015) (arguing that Title VII should prohibit appearance-based discrimina-
tion as a type of sex discrimination). 
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biased, particularly if it employs women, older workers, or racial 
minorities. 
As social-science research on implicit bias is still in its in-
fancy,252 there remains much to learn about how such bias man-
ifests itself—particularly in the customer feedback arena, where 
research on how biases skew customers’ perceptions is finally 
gaining traction after years of neglect.253 At present, implicit 
bias is difficult to detect unless a survey instrument is suffi-
ciently sophisticated to capture the type of advanced data that 
lends itself to the complicated statistical analyses necessary to 
uncover implicit bias.254 Even then, the validity of the results 
can be controversial.255 Given the current difficulties of proving 
implicit bias, it seems unlikely a court would require an em-
ployer to go to the expensive and time-consuming lengths re-
quired to detect implicit bias with statistical precision. While 
such testing may become more reasonable in the future, as ana-
lytical models become more streamlined, for the time being per-
haps less onerous measures that have been shown to reduce bias 
could be required for an employer to demonstrate it had no rea-
son to suspect the feedback was biased. Such measures might 
include, for example, “increasing information, responsibility, or 
training for raters” or statistically adjusting customer ratings to 
 
 252. See Allison Fisher, Note, Using California State Anti-Discrimination 
Law to Combat the Overuse of School Suspensions, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1197, 1207 
(2015) (noting that social science research on implicit bias is still in its infancy); 
John T. Jost et al., The Existence of Implicit Bias Is Beyond Reasonable Doubt: 
A Refutation of Ideological and Methodological Objections and Executive Sum-
mary of Ten Studies That No Manager Should Ignore, 29 RES. ORGANIZATIONAL 
BEHAV. 39, 43 (2009) (detailing the evolution of implicit bias research and ex-
plaining “[b]y the early-1980s, the scientific consensus regarding the im-
portance and ubiquity of nonconscious, highly efficient, and automatized cogni-
tion was firmly established”). 
 253. See Hekman et al., supra note 64, at 239 (noting that although other 
researchers had studied biases in supervisory ratings, this 2010 study was the 
first to examine “bias in customer judgments of organizational context or overall 
work unit”). 
 254. See Bertram Gawronski & Galen V. Bodenhausen, What Do We Know 
About Implicit Attitude Measures and What Do We Have to Learn?, in IMPLICIT 
MEASURES OF ATTITUDES 265, 280 (Bernd Wittenbrink & Norbert Schwarz eds., 
2007) (detailing the difficulty of measuring implicit bias); Jason P. Nance, Stu-
dent Surveillance, Racial Inequalities, and Implicit Racial Bias, 66 EMORY L.J. 
765, 820–22 (2017) (explaining the various “sophisticated techniques” psycholo-
gists have developed to measure implicit bias). 
 255. See Tom Bartlett, Can We Really Measure Implicit Bias? Maybe Not, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 5, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Can 
-We-Really-Measure-Implicit/238807 (detailing new research showing the link 
between implicit bias and biased behaviors may be overstated). 
 2018] CUSTOMER FEEDBACK DISCRIMINATION 2223 
 
remove or minimize bias.256 Although such measures could not 
guarantee bias-free feedback, they could be enough—at least for 
now—for an employer to legitimately argue that it neither knew, 
nor had reason to know, the feedback was biased. 
C. REASONABLE RESPONSE TO DISCRIMINATORY FEEDBACK 
Under the proposed negligence standard, an employer who 
knows, or reasonably should know, customer feedback is biased 
would have a duty to take reasonable measures to remedy the 
discrimination. Like in harassment cases, where employers with 
actual or constructive knowledge of harassment have a remedial 
duty, liability would not necessarily hinge on an employer’s abil-
ity to eliminate the discrimination altogether but rather its rea-
sonable efforts to do so.257 What constitutes reasonable efforts 
largely depends on the employer’s level of knowledge; the more 
an employer knows its customer feedback is biased, the greater 
the employer’s duty would be to take steps to remedy that 
bias.258 In cases where an employer is unaware but should have 
known the feedback was biased, it would make little sense to fo-
cus on the employer’s corrective practices, since the employer 
was unaware of the bias in the first place. Instead, a court might 
examine whether the employer took reasonable preventive 
measures to guard against relying on biased feedback in making 
employment decisions. By contrast, in cases where an employer 
strongly suspects or actually knows feedback is biased, assessing 
 
 256. Hekman et al., supra note 64, at 259. 
 257. See Vance v. Ball State Univ., 646 F.3d 461, 473 (7th Cir. 2011), aff ’d, 
133 S. Ct. 2434 (2013) (“Of course, the ideal result of an employee’s complaint 
would be that the harassment ceases. But Title VII does not require an em-
ployer ’s response to ‘successfully prevent[] subsequent harassment,’ though it 
should be reasonably calculated to do so.” (quoting Cerros v. Steel Techs. Inc., 
398 F.3d 944, 954 (7th Cir. 2005))); Neely v. McDonald’s Corp., 340 F. App’x 83, 
86 (3d Cir. 2009) (noting that remedial action is adequate so long as it is rea-
sonably calculated to prevent further harassment, regardless of whether it ac-
tually succeeds in doing so); Wyninger v. New Venture Gear, Inc., 361 F.3d 965, 
976 (7th Cir. 2004) (“An employer ’s response to alleged instances of employee 
harassment must be reasonably calculated to prevent further harassment un-
der the particular facts and circumstances of the case at the time the allegations 
are made. We are not to focus solely upon whether the remedial activity ulti-
mately succeeded, but instead should determine whether the employer ’s total 
response was reasonable under the circumstances as then existed.” (quoting 
Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2001))). 
 258. See McDaniel v. Elgin, No. 2:09 cv 119, 2011 WL 5006313, at *8 (N.D. 
Ind. Oct. 19, 2011) (“The reasonableness of the employer ’s response depends on 
the severity of the harassment and how much the employer knows about the 
alleged harassment.”). 
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the employer’s preventive practices would be pointless since the 
employer knows or is at least fairly certain its preventive 
measures failed. A court might instead scrutinize what efforts 
the employer took after becoming aware of the bias to reasonably 
prevent the tainted feedback from affecting its employment de-
cisions. 
The notion that an employer can fulfill its reasonable re-
sponse duty through either preventive or corrective practices 
constitutes a small but necessary departure from the employer’s 
remedial duty in harassment cases, where most courts seem to 
require an employer to engage in both preventive and corrective 
practices.259 Unlike harassment cases, which typically involve a 
series of harassing events, some occurring before the employer 
becomes aware of the harassment and some occurring after the 
fact,260 customer feedback discrimination claims are likely to in-
volve a single employment decision. It would be unfair to require 
both preventive and corrective measures in this scenario because 
the employer either is unaware the feedback is biased, in which 
case it could not engage in any corrective action, or the employer 
is aware of the bias, in which case the employer’s corrective ac-
tions would be more important than its preventive practices. 
Where an employer has constructive rather than actual 
knowledge that its feedback is biased, what preventive measures 
could the employer reasonably be expected to take to avoid lia-
bility? Again, the standard would likely change over time as we 
learn more about how implicit biases operate in the customer 
feedback context. For now, reasonable preventive measures 
might include efforts such as requiring customers to provide 
their names and contact information on feedback forms, which 
has been proven to reduce bias; soliciting in-person feedback 
 
 259. See, e.g., Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013) (noting 
that an employer may escape liability for harassment if it “exercised reasonable 
care to prevent and correct any harassing behavior”); Debord v. Mercy Health 
Sys. of Kan., Inc., 737 F.3d 642, 653 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that an employer ’s 
defense to a harassment claim “actually imposes two distinct requirements on 
an employer: (1) the employer must have exercised reasonable care to prevent 
sexual harassment and (2) the employer must have exercised reasonable care 
to correct promptly any sexual harassment that occurred.” (quoting Helm v. 
Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1288 (10th Cir. 2011))). But see Baldwin v. Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield of Ala., 480 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that an 
employer ’s duty is to “prevent or correct” harassment); Elvig v. Calvin Presby-
terian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 958 (9th Cir. 2004) (same). 
 260. See, e.g., Gentile v. Des Properties, Inc., No. 3:08CV2330, 2010 WL 
597433, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2010) (claiming the employer was aware that 
the plaintiff had been harassed but allowed the harassment to continue). 
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through interviews and focus groups rather than by phone, in-
ternet, or mail; asking for both quantitative and qualitative feed-
back; only using customer feedback after a sufficiently large and 
diverse dataset is obtained; using computer programs or other 
tools to identify word patterns that reflect bias in written com-
ments; having a statistician analyze customer feedback for signs 
of bias; requiring raters to provide their sex and race on feedback 
forms to facilitate the comparison of an employee’s ratings across 
race and sex; educating customers about the dangers of implicit 
bias; and providing training or other specific guidelines to cus-
tomers on how to accurately rate employees. Even if these 
measures do not completely eradicate bias from customer feed-
back, a court may find they were reasonably calculated to do so, 
which is all a negligence standard can and should require of em-
ployers. 
If an employer actually knows or strongly suspects its feed-
back is biased, it could avoid liability only by showing it engaged 
in corrective practices reasonably designed to prevent the 
tainted feedback from infiltrating its employment decisions. Of 
course, the best way to assure this is by discarding the feedback 
altogether, in which case there would be no need for a lawsuit. 
Other reasonable corrective measures might include only consid-
ering feedback from customers of the employee’s same race and 
sex,261 attempting to neutralize bias by statistically adjusting 
customer ratings,262 revising how customer feedback factors into 
employment decisions, gathering alternative feedback using the 
aforementioned preventive measures, and removing outlier re-
sponses from feedback datasets. Again, none of these corrective 
practices is foolproof, but under a negligence standard, they need 
not be so. An employer could avoid liability by making reasona-
ble efforts to remedy the discrimination. 
Returning to the introductory hypothetical, if Dr. Flowers 
could prove the clinic should have known her patient feedback 
 
 261. This response may not be entirely foolproof, given the social science ev-
idence that blacks sometimes discriminate against other blacks and women 
sometimes discriminate against other women in rating their employment per-
formance. See Lynn et al., supra note 109, at 1054–55 (finding that white and 
black restaurant customers tipped black servers less on average than white 
servers); see also Brewster & Lynn, supra note 110 (same); Sterling, supra note 
103 (finding that male and female attorneys rated female judges lower than 
male judges on a variety of personal attributes). 
 262. See Hekman et al., supra note 64, at 259 (suggesting that “organizations 
can perhaps measure and discount such biases or statistically adjust the ratings 
to remove the bias”). 
 2226 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2169 
 
was sexist (perhaps if early on, the clinic noticed a major discrep-
ancy between her peer evaluations and her patient ratings), the 
clinic’s liability would hinge on the reasonableness of its preven-
tive measures, such as requiring patient raters to provide their 
contact information, warning patients of the dangers of implicit 
bias, and training patients on how to accurately rate their doc-
tors. On the other hand, if the clinic knew the feedback was bi-
ased (perhaps if some of the patients wrote sexist comments at 
the bottom of their surveys), it could only avoid liability if it took 
reasonable measures to correct the bias, such as resurveying Dr. 
Flowers’s patients using methods less susceptible to bias, exclud-
ing male respondents’ feedback from Dr. Flowers’s overall rat-
ings or otherwise statistically adjusting the ratings to neutralize 
the effects of the bias. 
  CONCLUSION   
Customer feedback discrimination is a pressing problem 
that will likely become even worse unless the law provides a 
more effective framework for litigating such claims. In today’s 
hypercompetitive business environment, customer feedback is 
invaluable because of the insights it can offer firms about how to 
attract, satisfy, and retain customers.263 The high value firms 
place on customer feedback is evident in the ubiquity of their 
feedback solicitations, as consumers are bombarded with feed-
back requests seemingly every time they speak with a customer 
service representative, open a webpage, or eat out. This is not a 
trend that is likely to subside any time soon; in fact, technologi-
cal advances are making it cheaper and easier to reach more cus-
tomers faster and more intimately than ever before. 
Customer feedback can be unreliable due to serious flaws in 
how the data is collected and analyzed, and because customers’ 
perceptions often are skewed by explicit and implicit biases that 
impede their ability to fairly and accurately rate their experi-
ences. Both problems are serious in their own right, but the lat-
ter is particularly disconcerting because employers often factor 
 
 263. See, e.g., Jay Baer, 7 Ways to Mine the Hidden Gold in Your Customer 
Data, CONVINCE & CONVERT (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.convinceandconvert 
.com/digital-marketing/7-ways-to-mine-the-hidden-gold-in-your-customer 
-data; Aneesh Reddy, Customer Feedback Is a Pot of Gold, DMN (May 2, 2014), 
http://www.dmnews.com/customer-experience/customer-feedback-is-a-pot-of 
-gold/article/344837; James White, Customer Feedback: Worth Its Weight in 
Gold, INTOUCH (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.intouchcrm.com/customer-feedback 
-worth-its-weight-in-gold. 
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customer feedback into major employment decisions. If the feed-
back is biased, the employer has allowed its customers’ discrim-
inatory preferences to color its employment decisions—an une-
quivocal violation of federal antidiscrimination laws.264 
Although this is a serious and potentially widespread prob-
lem, it has not received the attention it deserves because the law 
does not provide victims of customer feedback discrimination 
with a viable path to recovery in most instances due to the courts’ 
rigid adherence to the disparate treatment and disparate impact 
frameworks. Remedying this problem does not require a com-
plete overhaul of the law but instead simply necessitates the ap-
plication of a negligence standard, as has been done in other ar-
eas of employment discrimination law.265 A negligence standard 
offers a sensible solution that would provide victims of customer 
feedback discrimination a realistic pathway to recovery without 
overly burdening employers. The reasonable-knowledge compo-
nent would allow a plaintiff to prevail by showing the employer 
knew or should have known the feedback was biased. It would 
also incentivize employers to make appropriate efforts to detect 
customer bias rather than looking the other way so it cannot be 
said that they intentionally discriminated. At the same time, the 
reasonable-knowledge requirement is not so stringent that it 
would deter employers from soliciting customer feedback alto-
gether or otherwise unduly burden business operations. Moreo-
ver, the reasonable response component of the negligence stand-
ard is likewise preferable to the current scheme because it would 
properly motivate employers to take appropriate precautionary 
and remedial measures against customer bias. 
If we are ever to achieve Title VII’s goal of eradicating dis-
crimination from the workplace, we must provide victims of all 
types of employment discrimination with a viable path to recov-
ery. At present, the law is failing victims of customer feedback 
discrimination simply because this form of discrimination does 
not fit neatly under either the disparate treatment or disparate 
impact framework. Rather than allowing these claims to fall 
through the cracks, the courts should apply a negligence stand-
ard to customer feedback discrimination claims by imposing lia-
bility on an employer if the employer knew, or should have 
known, the feedback was biased and failed to take reasonable 
preventive or corrective measures in response. As customer feed-
 
 264. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012); see also cases cited supra note 44. 
 265. See supra Part IV.A. 
 2228 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:2169 
 
back is likely to play an even more prominent role in employ-
ment decisions in the future, this standard will help protect em-
ployees from the “evils of employment discrimination”266—just 
as the Civil Rights Act and other antidiscrimination statutes in-
tended. 
 
 266. See Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1336 (6th Cir. 1983) (“The 
primary purpose of the Civil Rights Act, and Title VII in particular, is remedial. 
Its aim is to eliminate employment discrimination by creating a federal cause 
of action to promote and effectuate its goals. To effectuate its purpose of eradi-
cating the evils of employment discrimination, Title VII should be given a liberal 
construction.” (internal citations omitted)). 
